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[T]he social state is advantageous to men only if all have a certain amount, and 





Certain admirable people are campaigning for the institution of a basic income 
grant (BIG) in South Africa as the main policy to combat poverty. In a number 
of respects their arguments are persuasive, but alas, good intentions and good 
credentials alone are not enough. Prior research is essential before an informed 
decision is possible concerning the wisdom of such a large and ongoing transfer 
of resources. That research has not been completed yet, nor initiated in some 
instances.  
 
It is important to stress that this paper’s aim is not to argue substantively against 
a basic income grant policy. Rather, it sets out to raise the numerous questions 
judged still outstanding. Although directed at universal grant proposals, many of 
the uncertainties and knowledge gaps identified apply also to the range of 
pensions that exist as well as to child support grants. But these are not discussed 
explicitly.   
 
A number of distinctions need noting at the outset to avoid any 
misinterpretation. First, it is logically as well as morally consistent for a 
commentator to be committed to social justice, and therefore to far-reaching 
actions of redistribution, and yet to doubt that the basic income grant policy is 
the most efficient way to achieve it. Equity and efficiency are distinct criteria for 
any policy action, but they may or may not point in the same direction in the 
formation of policy. It is a commonplace observation that “Public spending 
should promote efficiency (by correcting for various market failures) and equity 
(by improving the distribution of economic welfare)”. (Van de Walle 1995: 1) 
An action scoring high on equity may nonetheless be seriously inefficient. This 
is the case with universal income grants. 
 
Secondly, putting resources into the hands of the poor efficiently is an 
achievement, but it is not enough by itself. The kind of use made of such 
resources by the poor raises a set of key issues integral to effective anti-poverty 
policies, as argued in the following sections of the paper. 
 
Thirdly, if one does question the efficiency of such a policy, using a criterion of 
maximum welfare per unit of resources (however measured), there is no 
obligation on the sceptic to propose immediately a superior alternative. In the 
current state of research on viable redistribution strategies in South Africa, it is   3
not realistic to expect critics of a proposed initiative to have one or other 
substitute policies up their sleeves. But this is what income grant advocates 
demand. 
 
Finally, because policy innovations of this size tend to cause changes in the 
perceptions and behaviour of economic decision-takers, their full effects will 
take a number of years to emerge. This introduces unavoidable uncertainty. 
Thus the decision to go ahead with a policy or not must distinguish immediate 
from ultimate effects, despite the serious information problems involved. 
Recognising constraints like this are essential for clarity of thinking.  
 
A central argument of this paper is that the policies and institutions that will 
enable escape from poverty, and thereby diminish the size of the national 
poverty problem, will be more demanding of design and implementation than 
are regular income transfers to the poor. The latter are attractive because of their 
operational simplicity. But they are ameliorative more than curative in effect, we 
shall argue. This is their inherent weakness.  
 
We need reminding that to arrive at correct policies is a discovery process. 
Interest groups and government have to learn about the underlying problems, 
like the kinds of new institutions required, the desired behaviour necessary to be 
attracted or coaxed from targeted beneficiaries, and the alternative policies that 
are realistic and rival to what is under consideration. The latter are a potential 
measure of opportunity cost. 
 
 
[2] Investment, growth and poverty. 
 
How do people escape from poverty? In a multiplicity of ways, but common to 
all these ways is the investment of resources in the present in order to reap a 
flow of additional returns in the future. Given the right institutions and 
behavioural responses, the outcome that results from this use is positive income 
growth. The alternative use of resources is consumption  which stimulates 
growth only if there is idle productive capacity. This distinction between uses is 
basic in all economic appraisal.  
 
The advocates of an income grant tend to assume that additional units of a 
resource made available to a poor individual will be equally effective in 
relieving that person’s deprivation no matter how they are used. This is not true 
at all. The consumption use of resources makes poverty easier to bear in the 
present because it increases personal welfare with immediate effect. Food, fuel, 
clothing, shelter, health-care and so on decrease the current burden of poverty   4
directly and rapidly. Thus it is easy to predict that additional resources will be 
spent disproportionately on these commodities by the poor (and in households 
defined as poor headed by women, a higher proportion is devoted to both 
consumption and investment used by children: Lund 1993; Duflo 2003).  
 
Surprisingly, the causal links between investment, growth and decline in the 
incidence and depth of poverty are not investigated by the proponents of basic 
income grants in South Africa. To view income grant proposals in an investment 
perspective, two channels of investment amongst a possible number are 
discussed here. These are aggregate investment, the economy-wide actions by 
the private and public sectors to increase the physical and human capacity to 
produce; and self-investment by economically active individuals seeking higher 
personal income in the future. These two kinds of investment are 
complementary. A higher rate of aggregate investment raises the probability of 
success in self-investment, although with a time lag. 
 
Ultimately when self-investment is sufficient and appropriate, for some 
individuals at the bottom of the income scale their new capacity to produce 
enables a level of income and consumption high enough for them to escape the 
state of poverty. If this happens successively for enough people, we have a 
growth process in which the average income per head of the economically active 
population rises, so that the bottom ranks of the distribution of income are pulled 
up over time, enabling their exit from poverty. 
 
A distinction underlying the argument in this paper is between alleviating 
poverty and overcoming or exiting from poverty. Escaping from poverty entails 
relief from poverty but not vice versa. This first category of action aims at 
amelioration. It provides resources to raise the current consumption levels of 
poor individuals and households. Whereas the second kind of action changes the 
material status of those defined as poor. By devoting a proportion of any 
additional resources coming their way to investment, poor persons raise their 
productivity as economic agents. Eventually they achieve self-sufficiency; that 
is, in the limit they cease being poor.  
 
Acts of self-investment include additional education and training for adults and 
for children; preventative and curative health care; the erection of buildings or 
other structures dedicated to produce output for subsistence or for sale to others; 
buying or making plant and equipment like machines and tools; accumulating 
working capital by purchasing commodities for re-sale, or using such capital for 
adding value in production by stocking up on raw materials, semi-processed 
goods or work-in-progress as inputs into final products for generating income by 
disposal in the market.   5
For the present purpose, distinctions between final consumption items, like food, 
and intermediate items more durable, like houses, furniture and appliances that 
yield consumption services over time can be ignored. This intermediate category 
shares the time dimension with investment but not its most important 
characteristic, which is permanent change in the capacity to produce. The key 
point is thus that the resource use alternative to consumption, the investment of 
acquired resources, raises an individual’s capacity for self-support, known as his 
or her capability. This concept, made prominent by Sen (1992, 1995) and others 
(Anderson 1999), is discussed further in the section on human rights.  
 
Amongst economists this investment perspective is conventional. 
 
‘For the longer run [of an economy], if growth is what we want, the 
goal of public policy should be to create the institutions and incentives 
that will divert production from consumption to investment in the 
broadest sense: public and private investment, human and physical 
investment, basic and applied research. As for inequality…at a time 
when impersonal economic forces seem to be pushing by themselves 
in the direction of widening inequality, for public policy to be doing 
the same thing is not a technical mistake but a moral disaster.’ (Solow 
2003: 51)  
 
‘Wide access to a career and a livelihood in society’s mainstream 
economy is again a subject of discussion…Great value is placed on 
the opportunity of working-age people [through self-investment] to 
obtain rewarding work in the formal economy and to earn enough in 
such jobs to be self-sufficient – twin conditions for what is often 
termed economic inclusion…Rewarding work here refers mainly to 
the job satisfaction provided by a job’s challenges and the personal 
growth from the resulting interactions with others. Self-sufficiency 
here means that workers earn enough for a decent living by society’s 
standards and possibly some involvement in community life – not just 
a wage sufficient for subsistence.’ (Phelps 2000: 86, 104) 
 
‘There is broad consensus that expansion in the skills, knowledge, and 
capacities of individuals – increasing human capital – is a key element 
in developing countries’ economic progress and in raising their living 
standards.’ (Pritchett & Filmer 1999: 223) 
 
Thus a key contention of the present paper is that investment is more important 
for overcoming poverty than consumption, and this is ignored in the BIG 
proposals. Although a truism, this distinction is of particular importance when   6
these alternative uses are viewed in a lengthened time perspective. By 
“importance” in this context is meant efficacy in lifting the welfare levels of the 
poor individual and of society as a whole out of poverty through deliberate 
policy action.  
 
Certain advocates of a universal grant policy in South Africa have training in 
economics and are certainly aware of this distinction. But their overwhelming 
emphasis on the desirable characteristics of a grant designed as unconditional, 
universally accessible and amenable to unconstrained choice in its use by the 
individual recipient perhaps obscures the crucial difference between investment 
uses and consumption uses of resources in the hands of the poor.  
 
Understanding the key role of investment in growth and diminishment of 
poverty is helped by the standard framework for formalising ideas about the 
causes of economic growth. Starting with what are termed proximate 
determinants of growth, rising individual income measured by convention as 
GDP per person is deemed to be the result of one or all of the following four 
processes. All stem from net increases in the flow of investment. 
 
I.   Capital broadening comprises the accumulation of new capital 
instruments for use in production by new members entering the 
labour force or self-employment, such as tools and equipment, 
new work stations, raw materials, work-in-progress stocks, and 
so on. 
II.   Capital-deepening is additional physical capital like plant and 
machinery applied to an average unit of output by the average 
worker already active in the labour force. 
III.   Human capital accumulation is education, skills training, on-the-
job learning, lengthened work experience, higher nutrition levels, 
and effective health services for economically active individuals. 
IV.   Productivity  growth  is the rise in output per unit of all the 
identified inputs in production, namely, physical capital, labour, 
natural resources, and energy. Higher productivity is transmitted 
usually by investment in new techniques of production. Often for 
calculation the inputs are weighted, eg. by their market prices, 
efficiency prices or imputed values, to obtain a single figure for 
the ratio between inputs and outputs by industry or type of 
commodity production (called total factor productivity). 
 
In principle, self-investment by a poor individual can raise their own output in a 
number of ways. In practice, positive growth initiated by individuals takes place 
mainly by additional equipment entering production alongside newly active   7
labour, or by the accumulation of one or other form of additional human capital. 
Broadly these are more education, learning-by-doing, and skills training. But it 
is difficult and rare for one person acting alone to do so through the successful 
introduction of a new technique of production. 
 
Net investment is the increment in the flow of invested resources over and above 
what is required for the replacement of capital items at the end of their economic 
lives. That end is reached when an asset has depreciated in value to zero. An act 
of net investment can result from a transfer of resources (as distinct from the 
creation of additional resources) where use of those resources changes from 
consumption to investment in the hands of the new owner. This is the 
perspective to be kept in mind when devising methods and strategies for the 
poor to escape rather than alleviate their poverty. 
 
Thus, the thrust of this section of the paper is to argue that the policies most 
needed for diminishing poverty are that kind which encourage the investment 
use by poor individuals of resources transferred to them by the state or by 
private philanthropy. Such use will require a deliberate bias towards investment. 
Plausible ways are the transfer of resources as merit goods, like longer 
compulsory education higher in quality; or by constructing infrastructure for 
making new economic activity profitable; or by public works programmes with 
a central skills training component to make participant workers more attractive 
in the labour market; or by subsidising new jobs in selected industries. The 
expanded supply of merit goods as a strategy alternative to income grants is 
discussed in the next section. 
 
The second kind of investment singled out here, poor people investing in 
themselves to enlarge the range of economic choices open to them, is more 
likely to occur in practice given a suitable decision environment, the right 
signals, and the perceptions of likely positive returns. For instance, the higher 
productivity and matching earnings that result from net increases in education 
and skills acquisition persist over working lifetimes for individuals irrespective 
of characteristics like gender. This is not invariably true but it is so for the vast 
majority of the economically active.  
 
A rate of return to such an investment of resources can be estimated by 
comparing its cost against the resulting flow of benefits projected to take place 
over a longer period. The private individual is interested mainly in the private 
gains – higher income, job stability, enhanced social status – but it is widely 
accepted that such investment also generates social benefits in the form of 
spillovers that are unpriced. These include outcomes like productivity 
improvements in fellow workers, a rise in the feasibility of new technology   8
becoming profitable, the improved health status of family members, a lowering 
of birth rates, and a range of other external effects on welfare that are positive.        
 
Recent work on explanations of economic growth has examined the so-called 
deeper determinants. These have drawn research attention because of continuing 
anomalies in the empirical and historical record, which do not yield 
unambiguous lessons for policy actions aimed at accelerating growth. For 
example, in the early decades of the 20
th century, Argentina and Australia were 
economies generating the highest average per capita incomes for their 
populations. But subsequently they slipped down in the international rankings 
by income levels despite possessing favourable values of the proximate 
determinants of growth, ie. I to IV as described above. Similarly, there are 
national economies in the contemporary world that meet these proximate criteria 
for expansion, and yet exhibit an unimpressive growth record; instances are 
India, a range of Latin American economies and numerous oil producers like 
Venezuela and Nigeria.  
 
The following three “deeper determinants” are subjects of an expanding 
analytical literature that aims to explain these anomalies. The role of institutions 
in encouraging or retarding economic growth in an economy is receiving 
particularly close attention, although generalisable conclusions are still elusive. 
 
‘Geography relates to the advantages and disadvantages posed by a 
country’s physical location (latitude, proximity to navigable waters, 
climate, and so on). Integration relates to market size, and the benefits 
(as well as costs) of participation in international trade in goods, 
services, capital, and possibly labor. Institutions refer to the quality of 
formal and informal socio-political arrangements – ranging from the 
legal system to broader political institutions – that play an important 
role in promoting or hindering economic performance.’ (Rodrik 2003: 
4-5, emphasis added) 
 
We have argued that the distinction between investment and consumption when 
applied to poverty reduction is essential for clarity of thinking about strategies. 
Transferring resources with the aim of more self-sustaining outcomes for poor 
individuals can be carried out in more than one way. So to devise appropriate 
policies we need to understand how and under what circumstances such efforts 
can be successful, leading to questions like the following. 
 
Ö  How effective are particular kinds of investment uses of 
redistributed resources relative to each other (in education, 
training, working capital, construction of fixed productive   9
capacity) in enabling the individual to escape poverty? Can that 
rate of escape be accelerated by the right state actions?  
Ö  Appropriate redistribution has been shown to contribute to 
“permanent effects on aggregate output and growth?” (Aghion et 
al, 1999: 1627). But again we need to ask what institutions and 
policies for redistributive transfers are most efficient in 
stimulating the growth process?  
Ö  The state’s traditional role in fostering growth has been the 
provision of public goods (like administration and law and order 
services), of infrastructure (like communications), as well as 
expanded human capital capacity (like education and training). 
This puts in place the preconditions for future growth, as well as 
a stimulus to current growth under certain macroeconomic 
conditions.  
Ö  Historically the direct redistribution of resource endowments 
aimed at enabling individuals to escape poverty included 
methods like land reform, compulsory education, the founding of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with preferential labour hiring, 
the nationalisation of strategic sectors, and the financing of 
public works for temporary job creation intended to result in 
permanent employment for a sizeable proportion of those hired.  
 
These issues extend beyond the confines of this paper. For the present only the 
distinction between the consumption and investment uses of resources when 
made available to the poor is emphasised. But this distinction is a highly 
strategic one, particularly so given the dismal performance of the South African 
economy in generating investment in recent decades. Figure 1 shows this 
clearly. The first panel shows the declining ratio of gross investment to GDP 
since 1980; and the second panel, the same decline over the same period in the 
three components of per capita investment. These ratios reflect movements over 
time in both numerators and denominators.  
 
Note that this aggregate data does not show directly what this paper terms self-
investment. But in the real economy a causal link between the two kinds of 
investment (aggregate and personal) exists, insofar as relatively low aggregate 
investment creates a decision climate that is not conducive to profitable self-
investment by individuals. It is also noteworthy that public investment, the 
component that has declined in South Africa the most relative to population, has 
gone down similarly in certain other developing economies, for instance in Latin 
America over 20 and more years (Hemming & Ter-Minassian 2004). But we are 
not able to identify common causes affecting a set of middle-income economies 
including South Africa.    10
In practice, with the hypothetical institution of an income grant, some fraction of 
the new income will be devoted to self-investment by a fraction of recipients. 
That happens with existing transfer payments in South Africa (Lund 1993; Case 
& Deaton 1998; Duflo 2003). But the relevant case to be argued is whether that 
invested proportion of grant income would be the highest possible for the poor 
individual and for society under all circumstances open to policy influence? Put 
another way, can poor people be induced to invest more of their incremental 
income in pursuit of their long-run desire to escape from poverty? Can methods 
of redistribution alternative to a universal grant raise that proportion? These 
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In summary, by design a basic income grant is not a component of an economic 
growth strategy. It is thus not likely to be an effective tool for poverty 
elimination. It is in conception a means of poverty relief, ignoring for the 
moment its other deficiencies raised in the remainder of this paper. That is its 
key limitation from an investment perspective on poverty.  
 
 
[3] Building a welfare state through merit 
goods rather than universal grants. 
 
Is there a persuasive argument for ranking cash transfers in the national budget 
above the free provision of merit goods like good quality education, health care 
and housing provision in allocations for the poor? Proponents of a basic income 
grant either do not pose this question explicitly, or they take this ranked 
preference for cash to be so clear-cut and unproblematic that no reasoned 
persuasion is called for. That is far from being the case. 
 
South Africa does not possess a welfare state. We have individual features of 
such a system that qualify for the title. Citizens receive a limited number of 
merit goods, like compulsory schooling up to Grade 9, old age pensions, child   12
support grants up to age 12, disability grants, free medical care for children 
under age 6, and the like. The jewel in the welfare crown remains the state 
pension, instituted ironically enough under the old regime and therefore subject 
to means testing and differentiation by race up until the 1990s. Means testing 
still remains, but the pension’s international uniqueness in a country where 
average income per capita is only middling has been widely noted (Lund 1993; 
Case & Deaton 1998; Seekings 2002).  
 
A range of merit goods is one defining feature of a welfare state. In discussing 
the pros and cons of an income grant as well as the policy alternatives to it, the 
supply of such goods is the most important feature of any such state we shall 
argue. But assistance to the poor is not that system’s only characteristic 
institution and programme. “The Welfare State is designed to provide a sense of 
security to all, not just to focus on those below the poverty line” (Atkinson 
1995A: 1).  
 
Also, constructors of welfare states do not necessarily share a common 
philosophical rationale. For instance, “luck egalitarians…take the fundamental 
injustice [in society] to be the natural inequality in the distribution of luck [and] 
view the welfare state as a giant insurance company that insures its citizens 
against all forms of bad brute luck” (Anderson 1999: 289, 292). This 
characterisation is true but it leaves too little scope for deliberate redistribution, 
the underlying drive behind developments in the second half of the 20
th century. 
 
In welfare states now considered mature, the institutional innovations that 
emerged after the 1930s depression and WW II were wide-ranging. They 
included social security in the form of a variety of grants in cash or kind, all 
conditional not universal; unemployment compensation; nationalisation or 
public ownership of activities identified as strategic for social welfare, like 
communications and electricity; deposit insurance against bank failure; 
expanded public sector infrastructure; and legislation providing trade unions 
with specified legal immunities for their actions, like strikes that can cause 
private losses to management, shareholders and other workers that would 
otherwise be legally actionable. 
 
An account of the welfare state’s history is not called for, although it is now 
prominently in the news with the Bush administration’s stated intention to alter 
drastically US welfare institutions like Social Security. But certain features of its 
origins must be noted in order to provide a context for the present discussion of 
merit goods.  
   13
•  First, in the past the political motivation for safety nets and 
poverty alleviation was not uniformly the result of democratic 
institutions, nor was it a simple liberal impulse. For instance, 
Bismarck is credited with the first German move towards social 
security provision in the 1870s as a tactic to head off more 
radical demands by organised labour and other non-property 
owning classes.  
•  Second, in European countries like the UK the commencing 
assumption underlying welfare policies early in the 20
th century 
was that much poverty was accidental for the individual or 
family. It was caused by unexpected contingencies which by and 
large could be insured against.  
•  Third, later in the depression-prone years of the twenties and 
thirties the realization grew that poverty “could be the result not 
only of social accident, but also of more fundamental social and 
economic factors” (Helm 1989: 29). This called for permanent 
not contingency provision for alleviating social distress in the 
state’s budget allocation.  
•  Fourth, because certain individuals provided for themselves less 
than was prudent for countering negative outcomes over their 
lifetimes, the rationale of “preference failure” to compensate for 
the consequences of such flawed choices was accepted early on 
by architects of the welfare state like Beveridge and his early 20
th 
century contemporaries. Paternalism by the state became an 
entrenched principle, and only much later was it contested by 
libertarians on philosophical grounds and by other critics on the 
premise that state decisions instead of individual choices caused 
extra waste and inefficiency. We say more about this in section 
[5] on the normative dimensions of income grants. 
 
The range of merit goods supplied by the South African state, their magnitude 
per recipient, and their coverage or availability to individuals and families are 
considerably lower than what is provided to the population in major industrial 
countries, with their average per capita income levels six to ten times higher 
(World Bank 2004). This has to be a qualitative judgement because directly 
comparable data on merit good coverage and expenditure is not readily 
available. There are, for example, definitional uncertainties as well as variation 
in conditionality, that is, the application of eligibility criteria concerning which 
merit goods are accessible to which individuals and groups. This makes 
quantitative comparison risky. But for the present purpose this judgement is 
unlikely to be questioned seriously. 
   14
If, as seems to be the case, in mature welfare states a universal cash grant is 
accorded lower status as a budget claim than more spending on the merit goods 
identified as inadequate or missing in those states, then the arguments justifying 
that policy ranking must hold even more strongly where the supply of merit 
goods is thinner. There are no serious suggestions in policy-making 
environments that outright grants be instituted above merit goods in these 
industrial countries. So one infers the same is true of South Africa at present, an 
inference reinforced by public statements from the Minister of Finance. This 
proposition – the ranking of merit goods over outright grants - is the main thrust 
of the present section of the paper. It can be illustrated by reference to the 
Swedish example, arguably the most thorough-going welfare state in existence.  
 
What is a merit good? Definitions differ in the detail to an extent, but the core 
idea is clear enough.  
Ö  Merit goods are those to which citizens [in a welfare state] are 
widely believed to have some right, irrespective of their financial 
situation, or those to which it is thought that access should be 
more equal than is appropriate for goods in general. (Holtham & 
Kay 1994: 5) 
Ö  We label a good or service a “merit good” when (1) we decide 
that everyone who is in a position to utilize it should have access 
to it and (2) when, in the absence of government provision, there 
are people who would not or could not acquire it on their own. 
(Bergmann 2004: 109) 
 
In no welfare state are all merit goods that can be realistically conceived freely 
available from the state. The obvious reasons for the shortfalls are their cost, 
uneven concentrations of political power influencing allocation decisions, 
challenging delivery institutions, and the difficult to measure and prescribe but 
vital dimension of quality in merit goods. The following list of unfulfilled merit 
goods in the Swedish case provides a guide to the items still missing in current 
South African efforts to build a welfare state (Bergmann 2004: 109-112). 
 
Ö  Schooling. All political groupings, conservatives as well as social 
democrats and liberals, recognise this as the most important merit 
good. “The best estimates for developing countries…find that 
each additional year of schooling is associated with a 6-10 
percent increase in earnings. This evidence appears robust across 
both methods and locations…[suggesting] that investment in 
education can be used to attack poverty both by encouraging 
economic growth and as a method of redistribution to the poor” 
(Besley & Burgess 2003: 14).   15
A major problem in all national systems of education is quality 
differences in what is on offer in primary and secondary schools. 
“Low-quality schooling and high-quality schooling are really two 
different services [and] in the United States…quality-enhancing 
reforms might well require a doubling of current education 
budgets” (Bergmann 2004: 110). At the tertiary education level a 
case can be mounted also for subsidizing the private costs of 
certain groups. But this is a weaker claim on equity grounds 
because university and other graduates eventually end up in the 
top echelons of the national income profile. Certain South 
African student groups are loathe to acknowledge the low 
priority of a demand on the public purse for free tertiary 
education, probably because of apartheid era politicisation of 
access to higher education. 
 
Ö  Health care. Most welfare states provide some items of health 
care on unconditional or universal terms. But again there are 
quality problems, permanent rationing, and a temptation to let the 
value of budgetary allocations erode, as in South Africa’s 
teaching hospitals and the UK’s National Health Service in 
recent decades.  
 
Ö  Childcare. In all welfare states this service, encompassing pre-
schooling, after-school care and recreation programmes, is 
particularly vital for single-parent households. But it tends to be 
low-quality, often from private and profit-seeking suppliers, and 
yet a relatively expensive item in the family budgets of the poor. 
 
Ö  Mental health care. In certain welfare states, homelessness and 
therefore poverty is associated with mental illness. Under the 
same heading are the disabilities caused by addictive behaviour 
from the abuse of alcohol, drugs and gambling facilities. A 
compelling case can be mounted for state-provided therapeutic 
services and dedicated institutions superior in quality to those in 
existence. 
 
Ö  Decent housing. Partial state funded programmes exist in certain 
developed countries. In the US for instance, the principle is that 
eligible poor families should not have to spend more than 30 
percent of their income for housing, the balance being paid for by 
vouchers. “But the program is not an entitlement so limited 
appropriations [of funding] allow only a small percentage of   16
families eligible for this kind of aid to receive subsidies” 
(Bergmann: 111). Currently the Bush administration is 
attempting to place a financing cap on this programme labelled 
Section 8 (New York Times, 10/5/04). 
 
Ö  Public sector transportation. Like housing and tertiary education 
subsidies, merit good status for transport is much more 
contentious than for other listed items. Nation-specific factors – 
history and culture – play powerful roles in the legitimacy of 
subsidies versus privatisation. For example, the first Thatcher-led 
government in the UK was determined to abolish state inputs into 
the railways, and this policy stance has endured under recent 
Labour administrations. By contrast, the French national rail 
network remains highly subsidized, and its performance is a 
source of national pride. The rationale for subsidizing certain 
forms of transportation rests on grounds of positive spillover 
effects (or positive externalities), in addition to its merit good 
status. “Greater provision [of public transport subsidies] would 
slow global warming, reduce sprawl, preserve green spaces, save 
energy, and revitalize city centers” (Ibid: 112). 
 
Ö  Social work services. The arguments for either public subsidy or 
direct provision of this merit good are strongest in urbanised and 
socially differentiated communities. Child protection services, 
youth and released prisoner programmes, family counselling on 
conflicts and financial problems, along with the wide range of 
rehabilitation efforts in existing welfare states are the major 
components here. 
 
This is an ambitious listing, so the categorizing of certain of these items as 
having merit status is bound to be contentious. But that problem is secondary 
here. For the purpose of this section of the paper – to illustrate alternative policy 
action to a basic grant - it is sufficient to concentrate attention on merit goods 
like schooling, health, and perhaps child-care and mental health services for 
which there is wide support. In most countries as already remarked, such support 
transcends differing value judgements and political orientations. Yet enough has 
been said to pose the following analytical choice clearly for the protagonist of 
basic income grants.  
 
•  Either a convincing argument has to be mounted that both cash 
grants and additional merit goods have to come out of the state 
budget for policies on poverty to be effective.    17
•  Or alternatively, a convincing case must be constructed for 
ranking grants in social welfare terms higher than the merit 
goods still needed by the poor, and therefore that allocations 
must be shifted within the budget to achieve this. 
 
There is ambiguous evidence from published sources that South African 
proponents of a regular income grant have advocated these policies or even 
posed these questions explicitly. In public statements the underlying 
presumption seems to be that a universal grant, if instituted, will be an “add-on” 
to existing social welfare policies, like the state pension and the range of 
conditional grants that have evolved in recent decades. But the further question, 
whether instituting such grants is advocated alongside an expansion of merit 
good provision, is also not posed clearly. From a resource point of view this 
would be even more radically ambitious. Financing the grants, their affordability 
in a wide sense, and the implications of additional taxation are the subjects of 
later sections of this paper. 
 
 
[4] Economic and social rights and a basic 
income grant.   
 
Investment has instrumental value because it is an essential means for the 
individual’s escape from poverty, an ultimate goal for every poor person. But 
once we adopt a human rights perspective, any realization of a right by an 
individual through whatever means has an additional dimension of importance. 
It achieves one or more components of what is intrinsic to being human. Self-
investment therefore has this additional dimension of value for every human 
being who is poor. 
 
We need to take this concept of intrinsic value further back, to the set of moral 
ideals that provide the philosophical basis for the notion of a human right. 
Applied to the present question about the merits of a guaranteed income grant to 
benefit the poor, it is very clear that the moral goals that underlie human rights 
are quite incompatible with a state of poverty. These goals range over individual 
autonomy, self-sufficiency, dignity, self-realization, and freely chosen 
participation in a community of equals, or formulated as “free and equal 
citizenship” (Pateman 2004: 24). Extended characterisations of the ethical basis 
of rights are possible and available in the large rights literature. But this 
description illustrates the point well enough.    
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Poor children inherit their poverty status and their unequal opportunities from 
their poor parents. Such perpetuation of states of inequality and poverty is not 
compatible with human rights, particularly not social and economic rights (these 
perpetuation mechanisms can also, and often do, hinder the attainment of first 
generation rights that are political and civil in nature). It follows that on its own, 
a redistribution of current income flows within society towards the poor by itself 
provides no assurance of countering the transmission of personal deprivation 
between generations. Such payments are ameliorative but not necessarily 
curative, we have argued already. 
 
So applied to the present discussion, the simple transfer of income alone, even 
when regular and persistent like a cash grant, is not likely to advance the goal of 
human rights fulfilment adequately. Rather, meeting such rights requires 
“expanding the opportunity sets of the poor”, and this is effectively possible 
only with the investment use of the resources put into the hands of the 
individuals and households designated as poor (Bourguignon, Ferreira & 
Menendez 2003: 2).  
 
This is an untested judgement. To test it will require accurate micro-level data 
on the spending habits of poor individuals and households. Then some 
extrapolation of the marginal spending decisions on a BIG, as a hypothetical 
increment of income in the hands of the designated poor, may be possible. But 
that is a future research task. 
 
Interestingly, prominent international institutions in the development field now 
manifest a wider interpretation of their goals even when such goals are not tied 
explicitly to the fulfilment of human rights. 
 
‘In the past two decades we [the World Bank] have begun to look 
beyond incomes to health and education. Indeed, we now look beyond 
the basic elements of human well-being and see freedom as part of 
development. We see the state not as a substitute for the market, but as 
a critical complement…government action is crucial in enabling 
people to participate in the growth process and to take advantage of 
economic opportunities’ (Stern 2003: xiii). 
 
A second reason why cash transfers will not by themselves meet the economic 
and social rights clauses in our constitution, is because the size of the grant 
proposed is too low by itself to provide autonomy and self-sufficiency to the 
impoverished individual in a middle income country like South Africa. In richer 
welfare states this outcome may not be the case if the political process yields 
citizen support for grants high enough to meet the minimum amount of personal   19
resources required for the individual to live on it (Pateman 2004). What that 
level is tends to remain an unsettled matter.  
 
Further, universal monetary payments of this kind and size do not exist 
anywhere at the present time, an independent reason for caution discussed later 
in this paper (Goodin & Rein 2003: 777). In the South African case specifically, 
the high proportion of the population who are poor can make the level of income 
provision per head required for meeting all constitutional rights fully a target 
impossible in opportunity cost terms. Such a high required level could generate 
distributive conflicts and negative growth projections that endanger the stability 
of the economy as well as the political process. Like other crucial questions at 
this stage of the research work, this is a matter of judgement not one drawn from 
relevant evidence.   
 
The literature here is extensive, so drawing attention to selected human rights 
approaches that provide a broader perspective on escape from a condition of 
poverty should clarify the present argument. These perspectives bear directly on 
the nature and limitations of an income grant as an anti-poverty measure. First, 
Rawls introduced the notion of “primary goods [defined as] basic rights and 
liberties, opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect” 
(Rawls 1999: 13). Primary goods have intrinsic significance for the status of 
every individual as human. In particular, “the social bases of self-respect” 
relates to the theme of this paper insofar as it widens understanding of what 
overcoming poverty means. Viewed thus, the proposals for instituting a 
universal income grant place an excessively narrow interpretation on the 
prerequisites for a human life.  
 
Second, will the universal character of an income grant be a sufficient condition 
to avoid the emergence of a stigma on those individuals and households 
surviving on such grants, with universality intended as non-discriminatory? 
Again this is a before-the-fact judgement difficult to make with confidence. But 
the point is that if a stigma does emerge from differentiation between poor grant 
receivers and rich taxed receivers – through the 100% taxation of grant income 
projected as a form of after-the-fact means-testing - then this mode of helping 
the poor by grants would not advance but rather obstruct the attainment of a 
range of social and economic rights. Ironically, this would be a policy-initiated 
obstacle to the serious implementation of the Bill of Rights in the South African 
constitution that aims to elevate equality as a moral goal.  
 
Third, an appeal to the general social interest will also not be a valid argument 
for a basic grant if we take the pursuit of human rights seriously. To weigh 
community advantage, presuming it for argument’s sake to be demonstrably   20
supported by a policy instrument like a universal cash payment, against the 
individual rights of a moral being, and to rule in favour of such a policy is to 
commit a logical error or category mistake. It would be to misunderstand the 
concept of a human right. Either one accepts that concept with all its 
implications or one does not. “Rights are trumps” in the well-known phrase 
coined by Dworkin (1978), meaning that individual right fulfilment is morally 
more important than raising social welfare. By way of illustration, Rawls starts 
his original argument about justice boldly: 
 
‘Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even 
the welfare of society as a whole cannot override…Therefore…the 
rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to 
the calculus of social interests’ (Rawls 1971: 3-4).   
 
A related approach to poverty within the framework of rights objectives uses the 
idea of human capability. It is associated with the work of Sen and others 
contending that freedom and equality are constituents of individual well-being, 
to be treated as such explicitly in assessing poverty and in devising policies of 
amelioration. The initial contention is that human beings by definition, in their 
conception of themselves and that of others, have values and aspirations as well 
as needs. Being free from poverty, and therefore escaping from it if poor, must 
satisfy these expanded criteria in addition to achieving the material standards 
measured conventionally in money, in kind, or in access to the resources 
required to reach those standards through production.  
 
Recent literature has formalised these notions in order to quantify poverty by the 
expanded concept of “capabilities-to-generate-minimum-necessary-income”. 
Those individuals at the bottom of the income distribution by this applied 
measure are taken to be the most needy. The new indicator in one interesting 
approach is labelled self-reliant poverty (Haveman & Beshadker 2001). It brings 
out as a constant reminder [1] that the poor, intrinsically and by operational 
definition, are unable to be economically independent, and [2] that the 
distinction between transitory and permanent capabilities is essential for 
analysing the difference between relief of poverty and escape from poverty.   
 
When these new estimates are compared to those derived by the official US 
measure of “income poverty”, several conclusions are prominent. First, self-
reliant poverty has grown “more rapidly and more steadily”. Second, the highest 
self-reliant levels of poverty are concentrated in the groups for long thought of 
as the most vulnerable: “Blacks, Hispanics, single parent families with children, 
and those with low levels of schooling”. Third, somewhat paradoxically, in 
recent times these conventionally poor groups have experienced lower rates of   21
increase in self-reliant poverty than those conventionally less vulnerable and 
relatively secure economically: families headed by men, white families, with 
relatively high levels of schooling, and “married-couple families with children”. 
The conclusion drawn is unsurprising for the United States with its large 
working poor population. But, more importantly for us, are the policy 
implications drawn for the US the same ones we should draw in the South 
African search for solutions, namely choosing more investment over more 
income transfers? 
 
The large and rapidly growing number of people who are unable to be 
self-reliant is discouraging for a society that prides itself on providing 
the opportunity for individuals to prosper and thrive by working hard, 
and playing by the rules…If income support measures are ruled out as 
eroding work effort, encouraging dependence, and fostering the 
growth of income poverty, what policy measures are available to 
reduce Self-Reliant poverty? Essentially, two general policy strategies 
are available: 
Ö  Increasing the level of education, training, skills, and other 
human capital characteristics of those at the bottom of the 
capability distribution. 
Ö  Increasing the “return” that the least capable members of society 
receive on the use of their human capital (Haveman & 
Bershadker 2001: 357).  
 
Two further quotations bring out what is distinctive in this way of thinking, and 
make clear why acts of investment to achieve the human rights goals of 
autonomy and self-sufficiency are essential to that end. 
 
‘To use a medieval distinction, we are not only patients, whose needs 
demand attention, but also agents, whose freedom to decide what to 
value and how to pursue it can extend far beyond the fulfilment of our 
needs’ (Sen 2004: 10). 
 
‘To be capable of functioning as a human being requires effective 
access to the means of sustaining one’s biological existence – food, 
shelter, clothing, medical care – and access to the basic conditions of 
human agency – knowledge of one’s circumstances and options, the 
ability to deliberate about means and ends, the psychological 
conditions of autonomy, including the self-confidence to think and 
judge for oneself, freedom of thought and movement’ (Anderson 
1999: 317-8). 
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Would regular payment of a basic grant at the low level advocated in South 
Africa advance these human rights of a poor individual? It would, but only in 
the weak and generic sense that any extra command over resources promotes 
that person’s potential capability for meeting rights goals. But it would certainly 
not provide the rationale that organisations in advanced welfare states like BIEN 
(Basic Income European Network) claim to be most convincing for its 
introduction, namely that an income grant will provide a permanent guarantee of 
freedom from poverty.  
 
That claim cannot be sustained here in our social and economic situation, which 
makes it a major difference and perhaps weakness of BIG campaigns in 
developing countries like South Africa when viewed in a rights perspective. As 
a policy initiative that demands a large mobilisation of resources even at the low 
level of R100 per person per month, its supporters must ask to what extent the 
aspirations of our Constitution will be advanced by it. The answer is not by 
much when measured against the programmes of grant protagonists in countries 
with average per capita income levels ten times that of our own. There a central 
aim is fulfilment of this “basic right” as a constituent in the deepening of 
democracy. 
 
‘If a basic grant is to be relevant to democratisation, it should be 
adequate to provide what I shall call a modest but decent standard of 
life. This is a level sufficient to allow individuals a degree of control 
over their lives and to participate to the extent that they wish in the 
cultural, economic, social, and political life of their polity’ (Pateman 
2003: 131). 
 
‘[Under a basic income proposal] all citizens are given a monthly 
stipend sufficiently high to provide them with a standard of living 
above the poverty line. This monthly income is universal rather than 
means-tested – it is given automatically to all citizens regardless of 
their individual economic circumstances. And it is unconditional – 
receiving the basic income does not depend upon performing any 
labor services or satisfying other conditions…as a matter of basic 
rights, no one should live in poverty in an affluent society’ (Wright 
2004: 5, italics added). 
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[5] The normative dimensions of income 
grants.  
 
The South African campaign for a basic grant has borrowed ideas and tactics 
from the international groups that seek similar political objectives. These are 
either access to capital assets or a guaranteed income over the individual’s life-
time, but with differing eligibility or conditionality criteria. Questions logical to 
ask are whether the local rationale for the grant that is put forward shares a 
common philosophical base with the other movements, and whether the South 
African proposals meet the criteria and circumstances postulated or presumed in 
the goals of the older proposals. The short answer is that there is a measure of 
overlap but also troubling differences.  
 
The issues below are selected from a large and growing literature, the purpose 
being to describe what is in question rather than to pass judgement on the merits 
of the normative propositions.  
 
5.1 The principle of reciprocity is the most prominent omission from the local 
advocacy literature. There are no statements asserting that the individual’s 
receipt of an income grant under the proposed policy, will be “conditional on 
his/her satisfying behavioural requirements, such as active job search, retraining 
or work itself” (White 2000: 509). Instead, following a number of left-libertarian 
proponents, access to the highest possible unconditional income on a regular 
basis is assumed or asserted to be a “social right” in South African discussion, 
although no direct link is established with our constitutional Bill of Rights. To 
Van Parijs for example, an international advocate of basic income with 
numerous publications (2000, 2004), it is an “entitlement derived from a theory 
of justice conceived in terms of real freedom for all [and] by ‘real freedom’ Van 
Parijs means (roughly) the ability to do what you want, and …his criterion of 
justice is that the freedom of those with the least real freedom is to be 
maximized. The means to real freedom so defined are resources…” (Barry 2000: 
5).    
 
Following the social right rationale, to benefit from such unidirectional transfers 
requires no more than the status of being citizens, or possibly legal residents that 
constitute a wider category in all societies with sizeable foreign and refugee 
populations. Ultimately this is a normative position based on moral values that a 
commentator from outside the forum of debate must either accept or reject. But 
it is pertinent to note that such a judgement – no reciprocity required - is in 
conflict with other moral traditions that are currently alive and well, for instance,   24
what has come to be known as welfare contractualism. In this way of thinking, 
unconditionality has to be tempered by reciprocal obligation.  
 
In addition, whether this requirement concerning reciprocity is in direct 
opposition to the notion of a social right is itself unclear. We have to examine 
the question whether a right to receive some resource without conditions 
attached is the only acceptable interpretation of this particular concept of a 
social right to resources. Or is a right of reasonable access an acceptable 
alternative that still retains the moral essence of such a right? 
 
‘The notion of a social right can quite intelligibly be understood in the 
second way as well as in the first: as an unconditional right of 
reasonable access to a given resource, rather than as a right to be given 
this same resource unconditionally…If you leave me all the 
ingredients for a meal, a recipe, the use of a cooker and all necessary 
cooking utensils, and I have at least moderate cooking skills, then you 
will almost certainly have provided me with reasonable access to a 
specific meal, in the above sense, even though you have not actually 
given me the meal itself.’ (White 2000: 510) 
  
This distinction, as well as the legitimacy of both forms of delivery of a grant, is 
unlikely to be acceptable to many proponents of a South African grant. But if so 
they are obliged to explain (i) why it is not acceptable, and (ii) why it does not 
feature in their justifying arguments for paid income alone, particularly as it is a 
distinction – access to a resource contrasted with receipt of the resource itself - 
that arises explicitly in our Bill of Rights, raised in the previous section (Archer 
2004).  
 
5.2 Commitment to the freedom of every individual, for instance the real 
freedom stressed as the ultimate objective by Van Parijs and others, seems to be 
the underlying moral impulse for the unconditionality of a grant. This 
conception of unqualified freedom will not recognise any indivisibility in the 
notion of freedom, nor any ranking of different kinds or dimensions of freedom, 
nor therefore any limitation on eligibility for resources deemed essential for that 
freedom. But the obvious question to be answered is whether such an absolute 
stance is compatible with other values that determine the integrity of complex 
societies with large and anonymous populations?  
 
The promotion of generic freedom can be argued not to entail enough moral 
content by itself so as to constitute a self-sufficient value judgement. Rather, for 
logical completeness and for realism, we need to distinguish different kinds or 
dimensions of freedom for the individual. These must be ranked by their moral   25
and social weights, with that weighting made explicit, open and supported by a 
rationale. “Thus it [real freedom] gives no special priority to freedom from 
disease over the freedom to be idle: freedom is freedom…The UBI 
[unconditional basic income] promotes freedom without responsibility, and 
thereby both offends and undermines the ideal of social obligation that 
undergirds the welfare state” (Anderson 2000: 1, 2). Again, these considerations 
go unrecognised in local discussions. 
 
5.3 As discussed in the taxation section [8] below, the South African income 
grant proposals contain the stipulation that a maximum income threshold that 
determines eligibility is integral to the policy. Individuals earning income from 
other sources above some maximum level will not be allowed to retain grant 
income. It will be confiscated fully by special tax provisions. This is 
philosophically anomalous, as will be pointed out later. 
 
Oddly enough, this is not a deliberate limitation found in conceptions of basic 
income in the international literature. Universalism is treated as absolute, 
although tempered with the recognition that upper income individuals will bear 
a larger cost burden on the financing side. The numerous variants here do not 
need discussion. It suffices to bring out the difference by quoting again a 
prominent advocate.  
Relative to existing guaranteed minimum income schemes, the most striking 
feature of a basic income is no doubt that it is paid, indeed paid at the same 
level, to rich and poor alike, irrespective of their income level…For the ex nihilo 
introduction of a basic income to work to the financial advantage of the poor, 
the key condition is simply that, relative to their numbers (not necessarily to 
their incomes), the relatively rich should contribute more to its funding than the 
relatively poor. (Van Parijs 2004: 12) 
 
Although generalisations are elusive, it needs noting that in existing schemes of 
social security including pensions, there tends to be continual movement in both 
grant conditionality rules and in the shifting incidence of the cost burden. This is 
probably because the longer-term consequences of programme introduction 
cannot all be anticipated in advance, an obvious enough note of caution but 
prone to be overlooked in the South African debate. For instance, the political 
costs of having to go back on a basic income grant policy would be high and 
socially disruptive. 
 
Two welfare state examples of changes in regime (recipient’s point of view) and 
pillar (provider’s point of view) that moved away from universalism in recent 
times are provided by Goodin & Rein (2003: 787-8). In Australia, coverage of 
the age determined pension was almost universal at one point in recent decades,   26
but then a means test – or “tall poppies test” – was “designed just to cut out the 
rich (‘tall poppies’) by excluding the top 20 per cent of the high-income and 
high-asset population.” Similarly, Canada has witnessed “a ‘paradigm 
breakdown’, with the rules of conditionality shifting from universality to 
targeting”, so that the year 2001 saw the introduction of “a new income-tested 
programme to replace the various earlier rules of conditionality, based on 
universal entitlement, guaranteed income supplements and tax clawback for 
high-income seniors.”  
 
5.4 Although the idea of a grant in itself does not stipulate any particular level of 
income paid, there are major differences between the proposals for industrial 
countries and the local suggestions for a BIG. The international discussions 
mostly favour payment of a subsistence income, whereas the South African 
campaigners project a size of grant dictated principally by affordability. By 
convention in many European countries, the poverty line is taken to be half the 
median per capita income of the population at any one time (this amount for 
South Africa is R2609 in January 2005); and low pay is defined as a level of 
individual earnings less than two-thirds of median earnings (OECD 1999: 154; 
Barry 2000: 6). Both of these measures influence thinking about the appropriate 
level of proposed basic income in the countries characterised by active 
campaigning.  
In practice, the amount of the income grant in the policy debate is more often 
left open deliberately. It is considered negotiable between government and 
groups active on behalf of the poor; therefore what expenditures per individual 
are judged to be essential and how they are weighted is seldom explicit. But the 
rationale itself for setting a particular level of subsistence income is usually 
couched in the international discussion at a higher level of abstraction, as the 
following examples show.  
 
‘The idea is not simply to assist those who lose out through accident 
or misfortune (although this must be done), but instead to put all 
citizens in a position to manage their own affairs and to take part in 
social cooperation on a footing of mutual respect under appropriately 
equal conditions.’ (Rawls 1999: xv) 
 
‘What we owe [to each other] are not the means to generic freedom 
but the social conditions of the particular, concrete freedoms that are 
instrumental to life in relations of equality with others. We owe each 
other the rights, institutions, social norms, public goods, and private 
resources that people need to avoid oppression (social exclusion, 
violence, exploitation, and so forth) and to exercise the capabilities 
necessary for functioning as equal citizens.’ (Anderson 2000: 1)   27
‘[I]f a basic income is to be relevant to democratisation, it should be 
adequate to provide what I shall call a modest but decent standard of 
living…a level sufficient to allow individuals a degree of control over 
their lives and to participate to the extent that they wish in the cultural, 
economic, social and political life of their polity.’ (Pateman 2003: 
131) 
 
These statements convey the flavour of what is argued to be the ethical and 
political basis for setting a high grant in high-income societies. In passing, note 
that a translation problem is an immediate hurdle, along the lines discussed in 
the previous section of this paper dealing with human rights. How do we come 
up with a Euro or Franc or Rand figure which instantiates these ideas 
operationally? But the South African discussion sidesteps this problem, because 
the main determinant of the level of a basic income in the future is presumed to 
be a hypothetical budgetary decision about affordability and opportunity cost. 
That decision will not be easy to make – assuming that, against the direction of 
current official scepticism, the political will for a basic grant should ever 
become manifest – because heavier taxation will cause a range of adjustments in 
investment flows, employment levels, changes in the industry mix, and so on 
(Barry 2000: 3). We cannot simply presume that second and third-round effects 
in economic terms will be too weak to have a bearing on the net outcome in the 
longer run. 
 
5.5 One other difference between industrial country and South African contexts 
for the institution of grant income is the markedly greater volatility in the 
incidence of poverty experienced by individuals in industrial countries. First, a 
much larger proportion of the population at the bottom of the income scale 
experiences temporary or transient spells of being poor.  Short in duration, the 
dispersion of personal need, which is the target of grants, is continuously 
altering. Secondly, in these economies the poverty of most individuals and 
households tends to decline over time, for reasons difficult to untangle but 
probably because of greater access to merit goods like education and training, 
health care and housing. In access to resource terms, there is no path dependence 
in that a history of being poor does not significantly predispose an individual to 
continue in a state of deprivation. So in high-income countries, “poverty is not a 
life sentence” whereas for large numbers, probably the majority of the 
designated poor, it certainly is in low-income, developing countries. (Goodin et 
al 1999: 7-8)  
 
The consequences for the potential role to be played by income grants in 
combating poverty have to be speculative in the absence of comparative 
research. Two implications illustrate what the differences might be that stem   28
from the different national contexts. First, the investment functions to be played 
by transfers to the poor, analysed above in the first section of this paper, are 
needed less by the defined poor in high-income countries. Resource grants, 
whatever their form, can be ameliorative more than preventative and restorative 
in nature. This means they can be simpler administratively. Secondly, the 
temporary character of poverty spells in industrial countries implies an increased 
scope – in comparative terms – for anti-poverty policy to pursue goals other than 
merely placing funds in the hands of poor individuals. Such scope for instance 
would include qualitative improvements in the nature of the services made 
available as merit goods to poor individuals, like education, health care and 
social security benefits. 
 
5.6 In the international literature, much attention has been devoted to the 
“Malibu surfer problem”, named after the example developed in the writings of 
Van Paijs. Malibu surfers are that category of income grant recipients who 
would choose deliberately not to make a productive contribution to society were 
a regular grant for everybody to be instituted. By definition such a grant has to 
be at subsistence level to provide the material support necessary for individuals 
with no other sources of income. Van Parijs has put up a spirited defence of free 
choice for Malibu surfers, a consistent logical inference from his left-libertarian 
emphasis on the absolute right of every individual to “real freedom”. This notion 
of freedom was discussed earlier in this section. But it is no surprise that 
commentators on international basic income proposals have found this 
implication of such an interpretation of freedom of choice hard to swallow.  
 
Are we likely to see a significant Malibu surfer problem in South Africa under a 
grant policy? Probably not. First, in the foreseeable future the level of the grant 
will be much too low. Secondly, an inherent constraint on the number of surfers, 
and indeed on the magnitude of all transfer policies, lies in the ratio between 
contributors and non-contributors in any economy. “[As] liberals emphasize and 
everyone else acknowledges, however grudgingly, the re-distributive sector of 
the economy is necessarily parasitic upon the productive sector of the economy” 
(Goodin  et al 1999: 260). Thirdly, the really interesting question concerns 
perceptions, particularly whether our historical background and cultural 
conditioning will induce responses similar to the Malibu surfer in a proportion 
of income recipients? In the local political arena there has been much rhetorical 
discussion about the emergence of entitlement attitudes in the years since 
political change was initiated. If they exist widely then we would confront a 
local version of the Malibu surfer problem (depending on the ultimate level of 
the grant), with the attendant resentments against non-workers to be observed 
elsewhere. Other potential effects of an instituted grant upon work perceptions, 
work seeking and work performance are discussed in section [8] of this paper.   29
5.7 Two final issues to arise out of the contrast between international and South 
African grant income discussions are (i) the feminist strand observable in the 
former literature, and (ii) the realisation that action on poverty is a process 
probably marked by increasing unit cost, an observation also found in the wider 
literature. It is surprising that neither of these aspects are prominent in the BIG 
debates, although it is accepted that in South Africa “[pension] money which 
goes directly to women is more likely to be spent on beneficial goods such as 
food for children and education” (Lund 1993: 21). In the wider literature, grant 
proposals are criticised for overlooking or underplaying the maldistribution of 
income and power within many, perhaps most, living units in poverty. Making a 
grant available for every individual in a household may well entrench single-
person decision-making power, with a lowering of total welfare effects from a 
given sum of transferred income. Once again the empirical evidence for 
confirming or faulting this surmise is lacking in virtually all countries where 
existing, not proposed, grants income flows are substantial. 
 
‘Putting democratisation at the center [of existing discussion about 
welfare policies] requires attention to institutional structures… 
Household-based schemes disregard not only all the problems about 
the sexual division of labor, and the fact that women earn less than 
men, but also income distribution within households. Can it be 
confidently assumed that income would be distributed equally 
between husband and wife? A basic income is important for feminism 
and democratisation precisely because it is paid not to households but 
individuals as citizens.’ (Pateman 2004: 24, original italics.)        
 
The second point about declining cost is simple enough, but it is not addressed 
in the local advocacy literature. Helping certain poverty-stricken groups – 
whether escape or alleviation is the objective does not matter – is usually 
cheaper than helping others. For instance, in head-count terms those beneath but 
closest to the poverty line require the least transferred resources so that the 
largest reduction is achieved by concentrating a given sum of transfer payments 
on them. But, although efficient by this measure of the extent of poverty, it is 
hardly the criterion and the strategy most people would support (Atkinson 
1995A: 35). In addition, it is likely that many of the poorest of the poor will be 
concentrated in remote, rural districts of any country because of weak 
infrastructure, and therefore are just the sorts of persons least touched by the 
state and civil society actions to lift poverty burdens. Under the principle of 
increasing cost or diminishing returns, achieving the last remaining fractions of 
any economic objectives can entail high marginal cost, or cost per person whose 
poverty is lessened in the present instance. Again this efficiency dimension is 
likely to conflict with widely-held ideas about priorities in poverty alleviation.   30




[6] Macroeconomic implications of income 
grants.   
 
Will payment of an unconditional basic income grant have positive effects on 
the macroeconomic stability of an economy? Or will it lead to overheating, 
evidenced by higher inflation, balance of payments imbalances, shortages of 
foreign exchange, and ultimately stringent fiscal and monetary actions of 
retardation? In short, will it more likely increase instability in the economy as a 
whole? The problem with the existing advocacy literature in South Africa is that 
proponents of an income grant all make the assumption that an output gap 
indicative of deficient aggregate demand is a chronic condition in our economy 
and indeed most market economies. In other words, a large and positive gap – 
deficient demand - is uniformly taken to be a structural constant at the economy-
wide level. If true that would make every stimulation of aggregate demand a 
contribution to stability, as well as providing the impetus for accelerating 
economic growth. But the plausibility of this presumption about the macro-
economic data is not demonstrated at all in the writings on income grants now 
available, nor does the standard data support such an interpretation; for example, 
see Arora & Bhundia 2003, IMF 2003.  
 
By contrast, there is clear evidence of long standing, locally as well as 
internationally, that the output gap is itself a cyclical phenomenon in all 
economies. Figure 2 shows such fluctuating behaviour in tracing the movements 
in actual and potential GDP, and thus the output gap, for our economy over the 
last 30 years approximately. Therefore demand stimulation, from an expansion 
in state spending and from a rise in the level of total consumption, which is what 
transfers through basic grants will tend to do, can sometimes be a beneficial 
stimulus but sometimes not. Indeed such stimulation at certain junctures can 
push up inflation, price-wage spirals, interest rates and other symptoms of 
macroeconomic strain.  
 
The model of a mature economy that provides the background to this 
interpretation is simple enough. It reflects the fact of more-or-less continuous 
growth since the recovery from the 1930s depression and the peculiar conditions 
of World War II, although marked by deviations in growth rates up and down. 
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‘Real output in most advanced capitalist economies fluctuates around 
a rising trend. One can argue about whether it is best to think about 
that trend as passing through successive cyclical averages, defined in 
one way or another, or best to think of it as passing through cyclical 
peaks, or some other measure of “potential” output. The important 
observation is that, on the whole, the observed fluctuations around 
trend are contained within a moderately narrow corridor. 
Unemployment rates tend to run between, say, 5 percent and 10 
percent in the United States. Other countries have different typical 
ranges…’ (Solow 1997: 230). 
 
This is not the place to discuss in detail the concept of an output gap as a 
measure of macro-economic fluctuation. But two points are worth making for 
non-economists. First, this idea remains at the heart of discussion in macro-
economics going back to the early 1970s when events like inflationary financing 
of the Vietnam War and dramatic oil price rises caused instability in most mixed 
economies of a magnitude not seen for decades. Equally serious for the 
discipline was the realization that received macro-economic theory was 
inadequate to provide clear policy guidelines to counteract this surprising 
instability. Simple demand cut-backs or expansions by state action seemed to 
make matters worse, not better. New strands of theory emerged to modify the 
old “neo-classical synthesis” that incorporated Keynesian thinking about 
deficient demand into the conventional framework. But the high degree of 
consensus once existing amongst macro-economists has never been recovered. 
 
Second, a related idea is that of the non-accelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment or NAIRU, which analyses economy-wide fluctuations in terms 
of employment rather than output changes. It is relevant to mention not because 
employment creation is now stated to be at the centre of South African policy 
actions (a useful by-product to this discussion), but rather because analytical 
work on the NAIRU has demonstrated that policy actions aiming at more 
stability can push inflation and employment in opposite directions in the short 
run. Most economists accept this, yet they also accept that this trade-off – 
buying lower unemployment by living with rising prices – does not exist in the 
long run. One cannot go on playing the trade-off indefinitely. But there is 
always the temptation to believe the opposite, as demonstrated by the Latin 
American policy experiments mentioned below. 
 
One recent example of thinking an output gap to be a structural constant is to be 
found in the 2003 Human Development Report on South Africa. 
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‘[W]ith almost 50 per cent of the population living in poverty, the 
total level of financial resources for buying goods and services in the 
economy remains severely constrained (constrained aggregate 
demand). This, in turn, deprives producers of a potentially much 
larger domestic market – a market that would allow them to operate at 
a higher level of current production capacity and/or invest in 
expanding their production capacity and employment.  This 
conclusion is strongly supported by [the] regular survey, 
Manufacturing: Utilisation of Production Capacity…Household 
expenditure surveys also suggest that, owing to high-income 
inequality and poverty, the overall demand for goods and services is 
relatively weak among 80 per cent of households in South 
Africa…These observations provide consistent evidence that low 
demand is one of the main inhibitors of economic growth in South 
Africa’ (UNDP 2003: 186-7) 
 
This passage is riddled with non-sequiturs. First, the manufacturing sector 
contributes about 24 percent of total GDP currently. How this sector’s average 
level of idle capacity can be extrapolated to the whole economy needs explicit 
justification. Second, in no economy in the world is the utilisation rate of a 
production sector, particularly manufacturing as the most usually measured, at 
any time a figure approaching close to 100 percent. 
 
There are well-known microeconomic reasons why what is nominally “unused 
capacity” is desired by producers. So the cyclical existence of such capacity is 
quite compatible with profit maximisation and equilibrium. Third, it does not 
follow at all that an expansion of aggregate demand, engineered by simple fiscal 
expansion – higher government spending or lower taxes - whether for 
redistribution or some other purpose, will lead to higher activity rates and higher 
real economic growth in a national economy. Fourth, under this way of thinking 
redistributive action is a panacea for macroeconomic gains because such gains 
are simply presumed to lead to higher levels of social welfare. All that stops this 
process happening is taken to be weak political will. 
 
These inferences are what the Human Development Report apparently wants the 
reader to believe. To place this belief in chronic deficient demand in perspective 
because it is shared by certain local activists pushing for a basic income grant 
(as well as other research projects under the UNDP umbrella currently working 
locally, like “An employment-targeted economic program for South Africa”), 
we need to recall the experience of a number of Latin American economies 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Regimes in power in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru experimented with stimulatory policies known in   33
retrospect as “macroeconomic populism”. These episodes had enough in 
common to make up a common policy pattern or paradigm that existed for a 
brief and concentrated period of time in these countries.  
 
First, the initial capacity utilization rates in each national economy were 
diagnosed as disappointing but holding the promise of more output. Previous 
stabilization efforts had put the state budget in balance as also the payments 
balance with the rest of the world, so that latent scope for expansion of the 
economy was identified by populists in government. Second, by assumption 
spare capacity and unit cost decreases brought about by higher levels of 
production were forecast as limiting possible cost pressures and inflation in most 
branches of production. In addition, the risks attendant on expansion through 
deficit financing by the state were dismissed as exaggerated. Third, policy 
prescriptions in the populist programmes of all six countries laid emphasis upon 
three components: 
 
‘[The] reactivation, redistribution of income, and restructuring of the 
economy. The common thread here is “reactivation with 
redistribution”. The recommended policy is to actively use 
macroeconomic policy to redistribute income, typically by large real-
wage increases that are not to be passed on into higher prices 
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In all cases the first phase seemed successful for these populist expansions. But 
in the second phase it led to negative outcomes, indeed to disastrous 
consequences, because of bottlenecks in the supply of goods produced in the 
domestic economy and in the availability of foreign exchange. Governments 
began to realise they were unable to switch the processes dominant in their 
economies from redistribution goals towards investment in all its needed forms. 
These components of investment were the stocks of goods in process (or 
inventories) as well as the fixed investment in plant, machinery, buildings and 
infra-structure needed for a permanently higher level of activity. In the third 
phase, pervasive shortages continued, inflation accelerated rapidly, the state’s 
budget deficit continued to expand dramatically, and real incomes, ironically 
wages in particular, declined markedly. In the fourth or final phase, some 
measures of orthodox stabilization were inevitable, usually under a new 
government, but after a great deal of suffering by the population. “The extremity 
of real wage declines is due to a simple fact: capital is mobile across borders, but 
labor is not. Capital can flee from poor policies, labor is trapped.” (Dornbusch & 
Edwards 1991: 12; Mohr 1994; Moll, Nattrass & Loots 1991) 
 
South African income grant proposals do not fit this paradigm completely. That 
is not in contention here. Yet a central presumption shared by the economic 
argument justifying basic payments is that the redistribution they effect will 
raise the level of effective demand. It will take income from groups who 
consume a smaller proportion of income, relative to the average, and give it to   35
groups who consume a higher proportion of it. But this rise in expenditure by 
the poor (and by the state) is predicted not to cause economy-wide imbalances 
because excess capacity exists in advance.  
 
This was a faulty premise to start off the argument for macroeconomic 
expansion in the Latin American cases, and it is a faulty presumption to make in 
South Africa. As stated already, true excess capacity is a cyclical phenomenon 
not a structural constant that marks all market economies. Expansion of 
aggregate demand through fiscal transfers may result in benign macroeconomic 
growth or it may result in overheating and imbalances: it depends on the cyclical 
position of the output gap and the magnitude of the transfer at the time. Further, 
the financial and budgetary orthodoxy adopted by policy-makers in capital-
hungry economies is usually to attract foreign investment, amongst other 
objectives. Sometimes this is out of theoretical (or even ideological) conviction, 
but often it is simply because there appears to be no sensible alternative in a 
world where capital movements across frontiers, financial as well as real, have 
speeded up greatly in recent decades. 
 
 
[7] The targeting and means testing of social 
transfers.  
 
In the sphere of policies that target individuals and groups for assistance in 
contrast to policies of universal access, we are again in an arena of competing 
judgements. We lack direct as well as comparative information from 
international experience. Thus an evidence-based choice on efficiency and 
equity grounds is not possible. The brief discussion here aims to tease out what 
is presumed and claimed by campaigners for a basic income grant, in South 
Africa as well as elsewhere. It provides perspective on the discussion not finality 
in the judgement. 
 
Curiously, our old age pension is not a universal cash grant that shares non-
conditionality with the basic income under discussion here. The state pension is 
available only to those citizens who fall below the maximum income stipulation 
at the minimum ages applicable to men and women; that is, it is means tested. 
An acknowledged success, it is regarded as one example of South African 
“exceptionalism”. No other national grant or pension system exists on an 
equivalent scale in another country at a similar level of average per capita 
income (Case & Deaton 1998; Seekings 2002). But our successful pension is a 
counter example not a confirming precedent for a basic income, in that it does 
not provide support for the claimed merits of universality.    36
The second curious feature of the proposal is that protagonists of an income 
grant in South Africa advocate that recipients of it above a certain threshold 
level of pre-existing personal income will have the entire grant taxed away. One 
presumes this is on equity grounds mainly, because the resulting saving in the 
aggregate cost of the policy is difficult to project a priori. For this to happen, 
once again a means test must be applied, as is inherent in all tax systems 
containing progressivity, meaning higher proportions of income paid in tax at 
higher levels of income. We discuss other difficulties and details below under 
the next section on taxation. These two examples illustrate that the aversion to 
means-testing for a basic income grant appears to be selective, and it is 
necessary to understand why.      
 
The relevant issues are the following. 
 
•  As proposed, a basic income grant is universal in two senses. It is 
non-contributory, not confined to individuals committed to a 
scheme by making dedicated contributions in advance; and 
personal access is unconditional, ie. not governed by conditions 
like inadequate means, disability, unemployment status, family 
circumstances, and so on.     
•  It is financed out of general state revenues not by an ear-marked 
tax or levy dedicated to that purpose. 
•  Pitfalls in the targeting of poverty alleviation instruments are 
recognised in the literature but perhaps less so in policy practice. 
  [C]laims [for increased targeting] implicitly assume that incomes 
can be observed with little error and that the observed initial 
incomes are fixed, that is, unaffected by the policy. In reality, the 
policymaker has imperfect information and can incur (possibly 
high) administrative costs in attempting to identify the poor with 
precision. Furthermore, potential recipients often face an 
incentive to alter their behavior when facing a targeted (or 
untargeted) scheme. Potential losers from perfect targeting may 
also exercise greater political influence than gainers; [thus] 
political economy considerations may militate against the policy 
ideal of perfect targeting. (Van de Walle 1995: 3)  
•  Universal access to income transfers would have a uniform effect 
on the welfare of the poor if this group were homogeneous in the 
relevant respects. But what respects are relevant? First, 
differences between income levels of poor individuals and 
households in the pre-grant situation clearly are one 
characteristic of interest. Taking the lowest 40% of individuals or 
households on the income scale as the relevant target group, how   37
much variation is exhibited within the intra-group distribution? If 
there is a long tail to the distribution of income amongst the poor 
then the implicit assumption of homogeneity – implicit in BIG 
proposals of a uniform grant – is potentially misleading in 
welfare terms.  
 
A simple measure of intra-poverty distribution for the present purpose is 
comparison of the mean income per decile (10%) for each of the four lowest 
deciles making up the 40% defined poor. These differ strikingly, as Table 1 
brings out for the year 2000, even if we ignore decile 1 with its anomalous 
implication that up to 4 million people were living in the year 2000 on R30 per 
month. To presume common average economic circumstances for the poor 
masks significant dispersion of income within the group when it is so defined. 
Distinguishing between the four broad decile groups shows that median incomes 
range in proportion from first to fourth decile at 1.00, 3.05, 4.63 and 6.67, or 
expressed in the monetary values shown in the table. The relevant question is at 
what opportunity cost to potential help targeted disproportionately at the most 
poor are these income differences ignored in advocating a uniform grant to all 




Median Income By Decile with Weights 
   Decile 1  Decile 2  Decile 3  Decile 4 
Absolute 360 1170 1800  2727.636
As Proportion of Decile 1  1.00 3.25 5.00 7.58
Source: Income and Expenditure Survey, September 2000, Person File, 
calculated by K Reynolds 
 
Second, gender sensitivity is a convincing criterion of interest for poverty relief, 
as also is the incidence of female-headed units in the household group that is 
designated poor. Third, the families containing above average numbers of 
children are plausibly an independent target of special anti-poverty efforts, 
where their numbers are increasing while the incidence of other poor sub-groups 
like the aged are decreasing within the total poor. Fourth, there can be serious 
urban bias in the availability of physical and social infrastructure. So two 
individuals or two households equally poor by an index of goods and services – 
possessing the same endowments in economic terminology - can face differing 
probabilities of exiting from poverty simply because of their different locations. 
Fifth, individuals and families designated poor vary in their ability to spend 
income and non-income resources prudently. So their welfare gains from the 
same-sized increment of transfers received from the state will differ. That this   38
may or may not matter for the design of pro-poor policies has to be argued 
explicitly. Finally, a parallel and overlapping category are the unemployed in the 
South African labour force. They are shown to differ amongst themselves in 
ways that bear on their probabilities of obtaining a paid job, and therefore 
require “specific kinds of interventions” not a single tactic only (Woolard 2004: 
3). One size does not fit all. 
 
Thus, whatever weight might be given in principle to other dimensions of 
poverty, for instance, relatively higher HIV infection rates amongst the poor, 
opting for a universal vehicle of transfer like a basic grant comes at a cost in 
foregone targeting. That cost is in no identification and no special measures for 
high-priority groups within the poor population. Focused “pro-poor” growth and 
poverty elimination policies are not possible because the relevant circumstances 
that govern the differing welfare significance of cash receipts for some 
individuals and households are ignored under universal access.  
 
On the other hand, specific targeting has its pitfalls, some already alluded to 
above. So we are yet again in an arena of choice between recognisably imperfect 
policies – the economist’s concept of second-best - yet with little evidence to 
guide the welfare-maximising choices that have to be made.  
 
 
[8] Behavioural responses of recipients and 
payers to tax-transfer mechanisms.  
 
An assumption implicit in all income grant advocacy is that the net effect of 
such a re-distributive policy on the welfare levels of a national population will 
be consistently positive. Yet the underlying reasoning is left unargued. It is 
presumably that the benefits are worth more than their costs, so that one unit of 
spending power received by someone lower down the income scale has 
consistently greater welfare significance than it has when yielded up by a payer 
higher up the scale. This is probably true over a certain range of re-distributive 
transfers, but we do not possess a widely accepted calculus for making simple 
judgements about all changes in the personal well-being of givers and receivers. 
Comparisons of changes in income utility between persons are of doubtful 
legitimacy, in that there are long-standing arguments that these are 
philosophically incoherent, even though we make such comparisons without 
inhibition in the everyday business of life. But also there are multiple effects of 
taking and giving that are difficult to identify let alone quantify.  
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That is the first difficulty to be noted. The second is that showing a positive 
welfare gain by an act of redistribution is not a sufficient justification. We have 
to go further and show that this way of transferring resources – via an income 
grant in the present case – is the most efficient feasible. The poor have to receive 
the biggest “bang per transferred buck” amongst all ways of making transfer 
payments in their favour. That is rather more difficult to show. 
 
The purpose of this section is to raise certain questions about gains and losses 
that must be faced before any broad judgement about the net effects of payments 
like unconditional cash grants can be sustained. Taxation and transfer payments 
can have the following effects in an economy, although this list is not intended 
to be comprehensive. 
 
Ö  After imposition of a new tax or increased tax, the supply of 
productive effort by tax-payers can decline or it can rise 
depending on the choice they exercise; that is, they can perform 
more work and thus retain income levels, or opt for lowered 
consumption and savings but increased leisure. This topic is a 
staple of economics textbooks, even if the evidence often remains 
ambiguous in practice. Generally it is accepted that a decline in 
the labour supply is more likely than a compensating rise in work 
aimed at maintaining the same level and mix of individual 
income and leisure that existed before payment of the tax. This 
has to be tentative because the major research problem is 
isolating how much work input changes downwards in practice 
due to this specific cause, higher tax liabilities. 
 
Ö  Incentives to invest and take risks in the economic arena can be 
weakened by higher tax rates, resulting in a loss of potential GDP 
and therefore lower levels of social welfare. But again this has to 
be a tentative proposition in the absence of empirical studies 
difficult to conduct because respondents may tailor their answers 
to benefit themselves, ie. avoid higher taxes being levied. 
 
Ö  Perverse effects on individual welfare are common. “On the 
recipients’ side of the tax-transfers system, there is also a 
disincentive to produce. For each extra dollar a low-skilled 
person earns with extra work, part or all of that dollar will be 
taken away from them because they [now] have less ‘need’ for 
income support, a clear disincentive to work. One can fiddle with 
the system… [but] sooner or later the benefits must be withdrawn 
if the person keeps earning more and becoming more self-
sufficient.” (Lindert 2003: 4)   40
Ö  Altruism is the “willingness to have one’s tax dollars spent on 
other people” (Gutmann 1998: x). It has to be conserved because 
it is a scarce resource. We do not all have utility functions like 
Mother Teresa whereby we obtain satisfaction from other 
people’s gain. But implicit in the underlying arguments of many 
universal grant protagonists in South Africa is the presumption of 
infinite altruism, as we might call it. What limits apply to tax-
payers’ willingness to pay taxes for redistribution purposes in a 
given society at a given historical moment remains a matter of 
conjecture not of evidence, because of the intrinsic difficulty of 
the required research. But in general, in most or probably all 
societies, “altruism is scarce; there is never enough to go around. 
[So] the function of economics [as a discipline] is to devise social 
institutions that make it possible to economize on altruism and 
still live tolerably” (Solow 1998: 3-4).  
It follows that it would be prudent to minimize demands on 
altruism, given the set of difficult-to-identify variables that 
influence its nature and extent in practice. These conditioning 
determinants or variables include the felt strength of a common 
culture; solidarity of beliefs and shared values in the population; 
legitimacy and acceptability of state expenditure policies in 
general, and on redistribution and merit goods in particular; 
perceptions of corruption in state departments and agencies; and 
the extent and tradition of private philanthropy. A commonplace 
observation, but vitally important nevertheless, is that all tax 
systems rely, for high yield and low cost per unit of revenue, on 
the unforced compliance by the vast majority of assessed payers. 
So it should be unsurprising that voluntary payments of tax 
liabilities can be fragile, as evidenced still in a range of middle to 
high-income countries like Greece, Portugal, Korea and Mexico 
(Van den Noord & Heady 2001). 
 
Ö  In national tax-transfer systems that have conducted research on 
the attitudes of grant recipients (like the US and Canada), it 
seems clear that the overwhelming majority prefer working to 
earn eligibility to receive payments rather than passive 
acceptance of transfers. The reason is not complicated. It has to 
do with self-respect, social standing and the dependence of “felt 
identity” on the regular performance of productive work. One 
key question is whether and to what extent the populations of 
transfer recipients differ in such attitudes, and in strength of 
preferences, in other countries than those where such research   41
has been conducted (and which in general have developed 
welfare state institutions)? In South Africa, critics of specific re-
distributive policies like free provision of water or the subsidised 
supply of electricity, housing and health care, for instance, cite a 
culture of entitlement arising out of our recent history. It follows 
that attitudes of entitlement will conflict with a preference for 
work performed as the route to eligibility. But it is not yet 
possible in this regard to draw a line between accurate research 
findings and political rhetoric. 
 
The ongoing enquiry into the differing performance of European labour markets 
and welfare states by comparison with that in the United States, illustrates the 
unsettled state of much of the debate on these questions. The following 
quotations from recent studies bring out the views contrasting with certain 
presumptions that underlie the grants campaign, while bearing in mind that 
South Africa is still far from possessing the resource levels and institutions of 
these mature welfare states.    
 
‘Our study relies on the large size and persistent character of tax 
differences among rich countries to draw inferences about long run tax 
effects. In summary terms, the data tell this story: Higher tax rates on 
labor income and consumption expenditures lead to less work time in 
the market sector, more work time in the household sector, a bigger 
underground economy, and smaller value added and employment 
shares in industries that rely heavily on low wage, low skill labor 
inputs.’ (Davis & Henrekson 2004: 36) 
 
‘Why haven’t countries that tax and transfer a third of national 
product grown any more slowly than countries that devote only a 
seventh of GDP to social transfers?…This paper has surveyed [in a 
range of European welfare states] some institutional clues pointing 
toward a non-negative contribution of social transfer programs toward 
economic growth and well-being.  The list of clues is eclectic and 
incomplete. We now have a better understanding of the tax mix 
practiced in welfare states, and the limits on the damage done through 
work disincentives…These findings can only be suggestive, and we 
are a long way from an overall quantitative accounting. Much of the 
story consists of welfare states’ avoiding ruinous patterns of taxation. 
In fact, their tax mix even resembles some classic prescriptions from 
economists’ optimal-taxation literature. The heavy taxes on addictive 
complements to leisure [tobacco, alcohol and gasoline] fit both the 
growth prescription and the need to address [negative]   42
externalities…Behind the eclectic set of clues and the hint of classic 
fiscal wisdom may lie a fundamental unity, a single mechanism that 
explains how welfare states found such an assortment of safety 
devices and avoided damaging their economic growth.’ (Lindert 2003: 
2, 28-9)  
 
‘Can European countries maintain the same level of social protection, 
but do it in a way which allows them to return to low unemployment? 
Again, this is a question which vastly exceeds the bounds of this 
article. But the evidence from a number of countries that have 
returned to low unemployment, from the Netherlands to Sweden, 
suggest that the answer is positive.’ (Blanchard 2004: 31-2) 
 
Turning to the taxation side, discussion here once more is selective in a complex 
field. Three issues are singled out for attention. First, how should we measure 
the burden of taxation in an economy, specifically a marginal increase in that 
burden needed to fund a grant? Further, can we generalise about the potential 
effects of South Africa’s taxation system – ignoring the welfare gains from 
expenditure of its receipts for the moment – by drawing on measures for a 
similar purpose from other countries? This seems a working presumption of 
some local proponents of an income grant (Samson 2002). Second, arguments 
for the institution of a BIG include the proviso that individuals with incomes 
higher than some designated threshold level will have their entire grant receipts 
taxed away, or “clawed back” by the state in the phrase used by grant 
supporters. This applies to a recipient group of unpredictable size who would 
take up grant income as a matter of personal right despite their exclusion by a 
means test decision. What complications and what consequences can be 
anticipated in carrying out this kind of confiscatory taxation? Third, all taxation 
changes payers’ behaviour to a greater or lesser extent. The relevant questions 
have to do with the efficiency and equity consequences of that changed 
behaviour. 
 
First, in making international comparisons to decide the affordability of higher 
taxation we are interested in assessing effective tax burdens. This means the 
actual amount paid to the treasury by taxable units (individuals, companies, 
commodity vendors) and not the formal statement of liabilities according to the 
tax rules in each country in the comparison. The latter do not take into account 
variables like individual or group exemptions and eligibility conditions which 
influence the tax actually paid and therefore the behaviour responses. Thus, a 
simple enough point, two similar “tax ratios” relating total receipts to national 
income in two countries may rest on quite different underlying adaptations and 
adjustments.   43
‘Why tax-GDP ratios can be deceptive [can be illustrated]. Assume 
the ratio of corporate income tax revenues to the value of GDP in 
countries A and B is 2.5 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively. This 
suggests that tax burdens are higher in country B. However, this need 
not be the case. If corporate earnings in countries A and B constitute 
10 per cent and 20 per cent of GDP, respectively, the average effective 
tax rate for the corporate sector is 25 per cent in both cases since in 
country A corporations pay 2.5 per cent of GDP on their profits equal 
to 10 per cent of GDP, and corporations in country B pay relatively 
twice as much in taxes on profits that in relative terms are twice as 
high as in country A.’ (OECD 2000: 9) 
 
Next, the nature of the tax base is ignored when using an aggregate ratio as 
indicator of the tax burden. In two countries with the same ratio, Country A’s 
tax system may aim to be more comprehensive than Country B’s system, for 
instance including fringe benefits and capital gains in the definition of taxable 
income that comprises the base. “One main shortcoming of [relating total 
receipts to national income] is that it disregards the tax base a tax is levied on. A 
‘tax ratio’ for a certain type of income tax of x% may be the result of a 
combination of (a) a broad tax base and a low tax rate; or (b) a narrow tax base 
and a high tax rate. The economic consequences are, obviously, very different.” 
(Immervoll 2004: 7)  
 
Additional problems can be listed briefly: (i) some kinds of taxes have 
consistently a stronger impact on economic behaviour than others but these 
differences are cloaked by aggregating all taxes together; (ii) an extreme 
example but not unrealistic is a specific tax in place which generates no revenue 
at all but is wholly detrimental to economic growth because it makes a certain 
type of productive activity so financially unattractive as to preclude any 
engagement in production at all; (iii) tax burdens need wider contexts for 
assessment, in that in some countries the private sector may be compelled by 
regulation to provide public goods in contrast to their supply by the public sector 
in other national systems, and can include the compulsory provision of social 
insurance; and (iv) the treatment of self-employed income is considered the 
Achilles heel of every tax jurisdiction because of the scope it poses for 
inefficiencies, inequities and inconsistencies. Generally speaking therefore, no 
simple statements are possible about the net effects on tax benefits, work 
incentives and the overall tax burden by using macro-level indicators like tax 
ratios. (Atkinson 1995B, Van den Noord & Heady 2001, Immervoll 2004) 
 
Second, all proponents of a basic grant propose that a threshold level of 
maximum personal income should determine eligibility, that is, to keep and   44
spend the grant not merely to access it. Above that income level, not yet 
specified in advocacy writings, individuals who take up the grant will have it 
taxed away. The contrasting procedure with the state old age pension is 
instructive. A means test is the hurdle to be overcome at present before being 
deemed eligible for the old age pension in South Africa; that is, the person’s 
level of income and financial value of owned assets is calculated in advance. But 
the difference in the case of the grant would be that ineligible recipients will be 
tracked after the event and required to pay back the entire annual grant receipts 
in a special tax assessment of grant income. Although the process is not 
described in concrete detail this seems to be what BIG supporters have in mind. 
 
A range of questions here need research attention. One clear requirement is 
accurate and up-to-date record keeping of grant payments to identified 
recipients, coupled to close liaison with ordinary individual tax assessments so 
that cross referencing can pick up grant income receivers amongst those above 
the grant retention threshold. Most of this sub-category of grant takers will 
presumably also pay conventional taxes, the number determined by the relative 
heights of the two thresholds: that for grants and that for income tax liability. 
Then having isolated the grant proceeds, or “ring-fenced” that targeted 
component of personal taxable income, a dedicated assessment formula must be 
applied to it in the shape of a “multiplier” to raise the marginal rate of tax on the 
grant to 100%. Then no net benefit will remain. In other words, the whole 
R1200 of grant income in a tax year – R100 per month in this illustration – must 
be taxed away. 
 
But a basic income grant is prescribed as universal in the sense of unconditional 
availability. That means that any citizen or any legitimate resident can obtain it 
without fulfilling any conditions. Yet an after-the-fact means test as a qualifying 
rider is an integral feature of the proposal. This may be politically expedient but 
it is a philosophical sleight of hand. Two virtues of the proposed grant are 
trumpeted to be (i) its universal character in keeping with democratic values, 
and (ii) the absence of a means test tainted by past humiliation, corruption and 
indeed racist distinctions between categories of recipients and between 
recipients and bureaucratic decision-takers, as well as administrative costs.  
 
But the inconsistency in the present proposal remains. In conception this is a 
grant based on solidarity. That means universal access for every citizen without 
exception, yet policy advocacy starts from the premise that it is not intended for 
individuals who command resources above a level set by political and 
affordability calculations. These exclusion criteria are contingent and ad hoc in 
nature, on a different plane from the deeper moral purpose stated to underlie the 
legitimacy of the grant for everyone.   45
Third, the most important effects from an economic point of view, and yet most 
difficult to predict about a tax-transfer process in the absence of more empirical 
information, are those relating to the behaviour responses already mentioned. 
Will the average South African tax-payer, when faced with higher tax liabilities, 
compensate by adopting more productive practices, by taking more risks, by 
working for longer hours, with greater intensity, by saving more, by retiring 
later, and so on? Or will he or she do the opposite because they calculate that 
every marginal increase in income is liable to a higher fraction of tax payable, so 
that increased leisure becomes their preferred alternative as it is not taxable? On 
the recipient side, will grant beneficiaries look for jobs more consistently and 
energetically, or pursue more informal opportunities that generate income, once 
their resources expand by the extent of the grant? Or will they put less effort into 
the range of activities, like job searching, that might yield greater economic 
independence, and instead devote their new grant income wholly to 
consumption?  
 
The sobering fact is that we do not know a priori which responses are most 
likely to occur. But it is erroneous to pretend that behavioural changes following 
taxes and transfers do not matter, as is implied by omission of the issue in much 
local grant advocacy literature. A number of questions need airing (Atkinson 
1995B, Barr 2001, Disney 2004).  
 
•  Informally it has been suggested that, by international standards, 
a higher than average tolerance of “tax fatigue” exists in South 
Africa because of consciousness amongst tax payers that in our 
apartheid past deliberate race and class barriers governed access 
to economic resources. It may follow that these circumstances 
call now for specially effective modes of redistribution. This 
conjecture might or might not be plausible, but does it provide a 
sufficient rationale for ignoring the question of higher “excess 
burden” from higher levels of taxation, ie. lowered welfare levels 
from distorted choices, meeting compliance and administrative 
costs and so on? In the absence of appropriately designed attitude 
surveys, not an easy task, this informal conjecture is far from an 
adequate basis for designing expanded tax programmes to 
finance a new grant.  
•  Spending on a basic grant will be financed largely by current tax 
contributions levied on the population economically active at any 
one time. This is known as “pay-as-you-go” (PAYG) financing. 
In the international literature it is accepted that this can insert a 
tax wedge into the labour market, depending on how it is levied. 
It means that the real cost of labour facing employers differs   46
from the real wage received by workers. It is an unambiguous 
distortion. Depending on the size of the wedge, it can inhibit 
employment creation or even decrease the workforce itself, 
which will aggravate the financing problem because fewer 
workers will be shouldering the burden. This is a possibility not a 
research result. 
•  Another broad generalisation about the effects of taxation found 
in the literature on other countries is that male economic activity 
rates – broadly labour supply and saving behaviour - are 
relatively insensitive to net increases in tax liabilities. This is not 
the case with women. But in an intermediate economy like South 
Africa’s in which women from a variety of groups are in process 
of becoming economically active outside the home (many being 
informally productive inside it), the burden of a heavier tax 
regime on activity rates may be particularly difficult to identify. 
(Disney 2004)  
•  One key determinant of behaviour responses to changes in 
taxation is the closeness of the link between individual 
contributions and individual benefits in the perception of the 
payer. This is a complex question, concerning expenditure on 
public goods (law and order services, defence, public 
administration, enhanced environmental quality) as well as merit 
goods like education and health care discussed earlier in this 
paper. But in the South African case of basic grant financing and 
distribution, such a link would be particularly tenuous if direct 
taxation is employed. This will be so because the vast bulk of tax 
liabilities on income and wealth intended to finance a grant will 
be to the account of individuals purposely excluded from its 
benefits. For them there would be no link whatever between tax 
payment and grant receipt. 
•  Finally, we cannot make direct use of established empirical 
results about taxation’s effects in one context, say in one country, 
to draw inferences for another context even if we keep it 
tentative. We certainly do not have a controlled experiment in so 
doing. 
  We observe that Sweden, say, has typically set higher income tax 
rates than the United States. Can we examine the labour supply 
in Sweden, compared to the United States, and draw conclusions 
about the impact of taxation? If Swedish doctors play more 
tennis and see fewer patients (a purely hypothetical statement), is 
this evidence that progressive taxation reduces work effort? The 
problem with such an inference is that we have no idea what   47
other factors may be influencing labour supply decisions. There 
may, similarly, be common influences on both variables [tax and 
work]…without there necessarily being any direct causal 
connection [between them]…The same objection applies to the 
time-series studies. (Atkinson 1995B: 140, italics added) 
 
 
[9] The preferences and choices of the poor.  
 
If poor individuals in any society were given a set of unweighted choices to 
make about the form in which they want to receive a net increase in resources, 
what would be the outcome of their choices? In particular what would be the 
majority choice? We certainly do not know a priori, and the international 
literature is probably not a reliable guide on a general answer to this question, 
given the influence of history, local attitudes and individual circumstances. Yet 
South African proponents of the basic income grant take the answer to be a 
uniform preference for cash income on a regular basis, rather than, say, the 
improved delivery and quality of merit goods. What the backing is for this 
presumption is not made clear in published advocacy sources.  
 
One contentious matter should be raised up front. Is the average poor person 
sufficiently well informed to make decisions between alternative uses of 
resources that consistently lead to outcomes in the best interests of themselves 
and those dependent on them? Again, we do not know. To some this question is 
anathema because it does not start off from the value judgement that individuals 
must be allowed to do whatever they want to with resources legitimately 
obtained. That is the left-libertarian strand of thinking referred to earlier, and 
argued eloquently by writers in the BIEN and other movements propagating a 
basic income. Nevertheless it is not helpful to be frozen into immobility by the 
fear that merely to pose the issue is to be found guilty of paternalistic attitudes 
towards poor people which are morally problematic.  
 
This issue ramifies too widely to be summarised satisfactorily here. Whatever 
position one adopts one is still faced by the circumstance that no modern state is 
inhibited to make a range of choices for its national population. It does so 
respecting the allocation of resources to supply merit goods like education, 
health care and grants to deserving groups, as well as by devoting resources to 
inhibit self-destructive choices leading to crime, unwanted pregnancies, drinking 
and drug-taking. It uses sticks alongside carrots, eg. by taxing the consumption 
of addictive goods, on wholly paternalistic grounds.   
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Of particular relevance to the basic grant discussion is the attitude towards work 
performance by the representative poor individual. Given the free choice, would 
such a person prefer paid work to inactivity in exchange for a cash handout? 
Clearly this version of the required question is under-specified. Much depends 
on the relative amounts paid as wage or transferred as grant; what work is on 
offer, with what probability and how onerous its demands are; the social 
standing that attaches to such work; and the stigma, if any, of receiving grant 
support. Thus a range of variables will bear on the decision between working 
and not working in exchange for grant income. These cannot be incorporated as 
a priori presumptions into the decision framework for modelling the question. 
They must have empirical backing, which we do not appear to possess in South 
Africa.  
 
Similar concerns were aired earlier in section [5] on the normative dimensions 
of income grants. But the difference is that the focus here is on what is plausible 
to project on the attitude of grant recipients to the performance of productive 
labour. Would the average poor person in South Africa, in reasonable health, 
actively  prefer making a productive contribution? We do not know, and 
extrapolating the experience of rich welfare states is fraught with unknown 
margins of error. But the American experience during the 1990s is instructive 
for showing what a change in welfare policies coupled to favourable labour 
market conditions can do to influence the choices of the poor, without any 
presumption that the same will be true here. The US achievement in expanded 
employment does not provide a generalisable answer to the question posed – in 
what form would poor individuals prefer to receive extra resources – but it 
demonstrates the kind of choices which a national poor population are capable 
of making in their self-interest when their circumstances change. 
 
‘There is one additional piece of good news from the 1990s boom [in 
the US economy], on which social science research is just beginning 
to focus – that forms of socially deleterious behavior that threatened to 
lock persons into a life of poverty also declined in the 1990s. Persons 
in poverty-prone groups seem to have responded substantively to the 
employment and earnings opportunities that the boom offered them, 
taking advantage of newly available opportunities to work and 
rejecting “underclass” activities that many analysts had come to view 
as an intractable part of the US social system. The most well-
documented behavioural change is the drop in crime…econometric 
studies, covering somewhat different time periods and area groupings, 
have found that the change in crime is closely associated with labor 
market conditions…For disadvantaged women, the key indicator of 
underclass behavior is having children out of wedlock in their teens,   49
which has historically led them to rely on welfare for their later 
subsistence. In 1996 the US Congress enacted legislation designed 
essentially to eliminate “welfare as we know it”…[policies] that in the 
strong labor market, succeeded beyond anyone’s expectation. There 
was a remarkable drop in the welfare population and increase in the 
employment of former welfare recipients.’  (Freeman 2001: 24)   
 
What this episode demonstrates is the preference for work in exchange for 
transfers in the choices of the poor, even though government had first to break 
the logjam by changing the eligibility rules. The majority of industrial country 
studies of poverty, not just American, take this demonstrated preference for 
granted. Why in the South African discussion about grants does the suggestion 
of a positive choice for a work contribution, or the institution of “workfare” over 
cash handouts, feature hardly at all? This is a puzzle. Is the assumed difference 
mainly a cultural phenomenon? Or has it to do with labour market institutions 
specific to each country? Probably both apply, as well as other influences like 
ethnic, religious and gender divisions.  
 
Certainly, economic inactivity rates for low-income individuals, like “the out-of-
school jobless, i.e. those inactive with respect to education as well as the labor 
market” in the 16-19 year old population, vary markedly between the industrial 
countries. For example, in 1997 this particular measure of inactivity ranged from 
Japan 1.5% to US 4.5%, Sweden 9.9% and the UK at 10.8%. Other measures 
show similar large ranges of variation, like the “unemployed” and “jobless” 
categories defined specifically for estimating the magnitude of inactivity (Ryan 
2001: 37-8).    
 
What the ultimate causes of high inactivity are, and by extension why a positive 
preference for inactivity might exist in a given society, raise questions that 
extend outside the confines of this paper. But for a perspective on the singularity 
of the South African proposals – their neglect of a potential preference for work 
by a proportion of grant recipients who might perceive it as a benefit not a cost - 
a brief account of the different presuppositions that characterise the American 
discussion of welfare and workfare makes clear what is at stake. This is 
additionally relevant because a participation income is a variant proposal to a 
universal transfer that is argued internationally to be much more acceptable 
politically at the present time – being activity-tested – than the institution of a 
basic income (Atkinson 1996, Barry 2000, Goodin 2000, 2003, White 2003, 
Dowding et al 2003).  
 
In American society paid work is “a primary source of public respect” (Gutmann 
1998: vii), but somewhat paradoxically the raising of children is largely unpaid   50
and not a similar source of status. This high valuation placed on work, or on 
“productive reciprocity”, has a number of key consequences. First, although 
workfare that meets certain criteria of “fairness” can be more expensive to the 
state than welfare, it has highly prized advantages. These are (i) meeting the 
positive preferences of poor people for work in exchange for transfer income, 
(ii) providing a net increase in personal self esteem, and (iii) obtaining thereby 
increased public respect for the poor. Second, economic policy needs to pursue 
or “to devise social institutions that make it possible to economize on altruism 
and still live tolerably” (Solow 1998: 4), which in the present context means 
conserving the willingness of tax payers to see their paid revenues spent on 
other people. Third, the fostering of mutual dependency in preference to 
complete dependency becomes an end in itself in the design of policy. Fourth, 
the number and proportion of people able but unwilling to work – historically 
depicted as the undeserving poor, and epitomised by the Malibu surfer in 
contemporary discussion – are judged to be only a small minority in present day 
America (Gutmann 1998, Solow 1998).    
 
We certainly cannot generalise these features of workfare and accompanying 
social norms to the South African policy arena, for a string of reasons that 
encompass differing political history, prior policies of social support, ethnic 
heterogeneity in the population, the institutionalised bias by race in the 
distribution of opportunities and resources, and a range of other causal 
influences. To take one simple instance, the international literature deems it 
likely that the strength of the poor individual’s desire to work in exchange for 
received transfers is influenced strongly by the total numbers of the receiving 
poor in aggregate, and by the fraction they make up of the economically active 
age ranges of the population. Yet we have neither quantitative nor qualitative 
information locally about this probable determinant of attitudes to workfare.  
 
Another clear dimension of international difference is that opportunities for paid 
work are in much shorter supply in the local economy for well-rehearsed 
reasons. In contrast to industrial country labour markets like the US, our 
joblessness is structural and chronic more than cyclical. Labour demand is 
determined strongly by technological change imported from abroad, that is, the 
skills bias attaching to input intensity, coupled to a preponderance of unskilled 
amongst the unemployed job-seekers, and a far less promising education and 
skill profile applicable to the average poor individual. Together these severely 
inhibit the attraction of net investment to new labour-using spheres of 
production. This unpromising outlook for net job creation is socially corrosive. 
But this negative effect is perhaps weaker than in social contexts where paid 
work is a key source of respect. Second-best substitutes to work for payment, 
like performance of civic duties and public works construction, will need careful   51
devising. Atkinson (1996) is a widely cited protagonist of such an extended 
“participation” condition for eligibility. 
 
‘In my proposal, the basic income would be paid conditional on 
participation. I should stress at once that this is not limited to labour 
market participation. While the qualifying conditions would include 
people working as an employee or self-employed, absent from work 
on grounds of sickness or injury, and unemployed but available for 
work, it would also include people engaging in approved forms of 
education or training, caring for young, elderly or disabled dependents 
or undertaking approved forms of voluntary work, etc. The condition 
involves neither payment nor work; it is a wider definition of social 
contribution.’ (68-9) 
 
Finally, as a matter of simple arithmetic, if an income grant is instituted without 
any increase in employment or productive work performed on own account by 
those not engaged in production, then the burden of re-distributive transfers 
shouldered by the average member of the economically active population must 
rise. In the long run will this be viewed by the producing individuals as free 
riding by others, as seems likely in countries like the United States where work 
performance has intrinsic as well as instrumental value? Or instead will the 
governing perception be that of benevolence justified by purely moral 
considerations of a particular kind that lack the expectation of productive 
reciprocity?  
 
We do not know which of these potential outcomes is most probable in South 
Africa. The attitude of potential recipients towards work performance in 
exchange for grants remains a closed black box. But that the pursuit of 
egalitarian objectives without reciprocal obligations might provoke feelings of 
resentment that undermine the spirit of solidarity presumed to exist in both 
givers and receivers is a distinct possibility widely canvassed in the broader 
literature. (White 2000: 513) So it must play a role in policy deliberations. Yet 
such an adverse outcome is not seriously acknowledged in the advocacy 
literature arising out of local South African discussion.  
 
 
[10] Private philanthropy and state-funded 
grants. 
 
How will the flow of private donations to charities serving the poor respond to 
the institution of an income grant from the state budget aimed at the poor? Yet 
again the refrain has to be that we do not know. But we certainly need to know   52
in case there is a significant decline in private giving. This would have to be 
deducted from the gross resource flow towards the relief of poverty from all 
sources in estimating what the total available – or net – amount is reaching the 
poor population at any one time.  
 
Discussion in other countries takes it for granted that the reaction of the non-
profit sector to increases in public contributions of resources, towards particular 
activities like welfare and charity, can cause a crowding out of private 
contributions to these activities. “Crowding out occurs when donors feel that 
their contributions are less needed because of increases in other revenues, or 
where the character of such revenues make the [non-profit] organization seem 
less attractive” (Young 1998: 198). 
 
Symmetrically there have been documented effects in the opposite direction, 
when decreases in public contributions to a range of causes have occurred. For 
instance, in recent years declines in federal government funding of universities 
and research institutes in the United States have lead to increased solicitation, 
more private donations and even the inception of commercial transactions 
involving research results (Weisbrod 1998).  
 
In keeping with the concerns of this paper, one contention in the literature is 
“that private charity to the poor in the US fell to almost zero beginning in the 
1930s, around the same time when large-scale federal support programs for the 
poor were first implemented…[although] it is difficult to determine from this 
temporal correlation whether public programs displaced private charity or 
whether they were instead implemented in response to a decline in private 
support networks” (Jensen 2004: 91, original italics). 
 
In South Africa, the rough equivalent of the non-profit sector is what we term 
NGOs or civil society organisations devoted to an enormous range of activities, 
of which charity is a substantial sub-set. But the main question we raise here 
about the potential extent of crowding out in response to a basic grant policy, 
concerns not only the responses of established welfare organisations but also the 
private and informal gifts to the poor which are not necessarily channelled 
through institutions. There do not seem to be research results from an all-
encompassing research net that is needed to provide an answer.  
 
Two final observations about South African philanthropy are worth pondering. 
First, in contrast to the large-scale corporate providers of social spending, who 
concentrate on sport and education, it is their smaller counterparts who “spend 
more on local welfare and benevolent agencies. Small and medium-sized 
companies are the backbone of local welfare initiatives” (Schlemmer 1999: 5).   53
How they would react to the institution of a tax-funded universal grant would be 
highly pertinent to know. Secondly, an important change for the NGO sphere 
initiated by the new ANC-led governments of the last decade has been the 
attempt to centralise the receipt and dispersion of development funding, 
especially that from abroad. How successful this strategy has been for meeting 
state priorities and for raising the volume of aid flow is a matter of conjecture. 
What does seem clear is that the NGO sector has shrunk absolutely. Yet whether 
this policy will be judged overall a success in the long run is difficult to decide 
given the political dimensions that attach to the question. But if the following 
suggestion is correct we will certainly continue to need a substantial NGO sector 
to serve South Africa’s heterogeneous population. 
 
‘The more homogeneous a society is, the more similar are its citizens’ 
preferences, and the smaller the need for nonprofit organizations. In 
countries with relatively homogeneous populations, such as in 
Scandanavia, government is sufficient to meet the wants of its citizens 
for the various collective-type services; thus we find that governments 
are in fact considerably larger in those countries, while the nonprofit 
sectors are relatively unimportant. This helps to explain two 
phenomena that have been widely observed: first, the far greater 
importance of the nonprofit sector in the United States than in other 
countries; and second, the growing importance of nonprofits 
everywhere, as population migration and information flows through 
television and computers are having the effect of magnifying diversity 
in country after country’ (Weisbrod 1998: 3).     
 
 
[11] Logistical issues in a basic income policy. 
 
To a number of commentators the successful institution of a regular grant, 
whether on a monthly or quarterly basis, will hinge decisively on the mundane 
question of logistical and administrative feasibility. The precedents are not 
promising. First, at present the combined efforts of the banking sector, the 
private security industry, and the police have only limited success in controlling 
the volume of “cash-in-transit heists”. Making a much higher flow of cash 
available throughout the country will probably increase the incidence of losses 
through crime, although the relationship between cash flows and crime losses 
might not be proportional. There are claims that provincial officials in 
departments of social welfare and population development are implicated in 
cash robberies, for instance recently in Kwazulu-Natal (Sunday Independent, 13 
March 2005). Second, monthly pension payouts are still not efficiently 
conducted, even where the work has been subcontracted to the private sector.   54
Also, the logistical problems besetting payouts of pensions and other grant 
incomes seem most frequent and intractable in the poorest provinces. 
 
The international literature on basic incomes devotes little attention to these 
practical issues. Where payment mechanisms are in question the common 
assumption is that the most advanced technology for cash dispersion can be 
presumed in place were a grant scheme to be instituted. Whether the 
presumption of lower costs (in the quotation below) due to the universal – 
unconditional – character of such a policy would make the overall costs per unit 
of transferred income lower than a conditional scheme would is entirely 
conjectural. But that is not the main point here, which rather concerns the 
realism of assuming the most up-to-date technology would be affordable and 
workable in South African conditions.  
 
‘[Transfers] are reallocations of purchasing power. This does not 
mean they are costless. They do have a distributive cost to the net 
contributors, and they do have an economic cost through the 
disincentives they create…In addition, there are administrative costs. 
But, as also pointed out earlier, assuming a computerised and efficient 
tax-collection and tranfer-payment technology, these are likely to be 
lower under a universal, ex ante scheme than under a means-tested ex-
post one, at least for a given level of effectiveness at reaching the 
poor’ (Van Parijs 2004: 20).  
 
 
[12] Conclusion: wishing will not make it so. 
 
If persistence and commendable intentions were the only criteria for deciding on 
good public policies then a basic income grant proposal would have won the day 
by now. A fair number of individuals as well as groups like the BIG Coalition 
subscribe to the view that an income grant will assist the South African poor 
more than will any other policy instrument of equivalent cost that might be 
devised.  
 
This paper argues that such a conclusion is wholly premature. It is not supported 
by research that poses the questions outstanding, and therefore universal grant 
advocacy presents few answers that bear unambiguously one way or another. At 
this stage in policy formation we are in the realm of tentative judgement and not 
evidence-based conclusion. Many people are in favour of redistribution on 
grounds of social justice, including adherence to the moral basis of human rights 
for all citizens. But that does not entail commitment to any specific policy 
action. The basic income grant proposal is an example of “misplaced   55
concreteness”, in that it opts for one mode of transfer to the poor to the 
exclusion of all alternative modes. As members of a moral community, what we 
owe one another is not simply money, “not the means to generic freedom but the 
social conditions…the rights, institutions, social norms, public goods and private 
resources that people need to avoid oppression (social exclusion, violence, 
exploitation, and so forth) and to exercise the capabilities necessary for 
functioning as equal citizens” (Anderson 2000: 1, italics added).  
 
In accordance with this conception of the poverty problem, a major theme of this 
paper has been that an investment perspective is essential for clarity of thought 
about policies of escape by poor individuals. That it is missing from the majority 
of writings that urge the institution of a basic grant in South Africa is 
regrettable. We speculated earlier that it might be a consequence of the single-
minded concern with the universality of access deemed to be an absolute 
precondition for any and every increase in resource transfers to the poor. That 
contrasts markedly with the set of conditionalities that characterised poverty 
programmes under the old regime, and provided scope for discrimination as the 
essence of apartheid. Because of black political subordination, a great deal of 
arbitrariness, inefficiency and personal humiliation accompanied many transfer 
payments. But this suggestion of an exaggerated reaction against past practice 
by grant protagonists is a conjecture and no more at this stage of the research. 
 
Whatever the true reason, one consequence is that advocacy arguments blur the 
distinction between transfers aimed at the relief of poverty and transfers 
intended to facilitate escape from poverty. Commonplace though it may be, this 
distinction is the key to clarity of thought about choices between anti-poverty 
policies. As a thought experiment, if a basic income grant were put in place 
now, and twenty years down the line the same proportion of the population were 
judged in relative and absolute terms to be in poverty, would the programme be 
assessed as having been successful? Consistent with BIG arguments the answer 
would have to be yes, because there was less deprivation and suffering in the 
interim period. Yet many other people concerned with poverty would be 
inclined to say no, because the magnitude of the problem remains just as large as 
at the commencement of the policy.  
 
A final remark is that untapped altruism amongst the rich is presumed by many 
basic grant proponents in South Africa. Yet for consistency they need to make 
the even stronger presumption that the existing solidarity is so robust – there are 
such surplus reserves of altruism amongst tax-payers – that an income grant 
policy that raises the tax burden will not erode solidarity. So it is deemed 
politically feasible in South Africa.  
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One searches in vain for evidence-based arguments in support of either these 
premises. They go entirely in the opposite direction to what is judged to be 
realistic in international discussion of redistribution actions, and thus what is 
deemed to be feasible in shoring up the welfare state in industrial countries. 
There the reciprocity principle is alive and well on both sides of the transfer 
relationship between payers and receivers. That alone should make us pause 
when faced with the demand for a universal, unconditional and indefinite 
payment institution. 
 
We have argued that a move to a grant paid to all citizens – or to the wider class 
of all inhabitants in line with a recent Constitutional Court ruling confirming 
access to rights for legally resident foreigners in South Africa – will require a 
major transformation in social attitudes and economic structure. There is no sign 
of that likely to come about without social tensions and economic disruption. 
But no protagonist of the grant appears to be pursuing the research outlined in 
this paper to make informed decisions on the range of issues that inhere in the 
policy they propagate. On the contrary that seems to us an essential pre-requisite 
for rational decision-making.   57
References. 
 
Aghion, P., E. Caroli & C. Garcia-Penalosa 1999 Inequality and economic 
growth: the perspective of the new growth theories. Journal of Economic 
Literature 37, 1615-1660. 
 
Anderson, E. 1999 What is the point of equality? Ethics 109, 287-337. 
 
Anderson, E. 2000 Optional freedoms. Boston Review, October-November 
2000, 1-4. 
 
Archer, S. 2004 The economic interpretation of legal concepts in the South 
African Bill of Rights. Conference paper, Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced 
Study (STIAS) Conference on Social and Economic Justice, July 2004. 
 
Arora, V. & A. Bhundia 2003 Potential output and total factor productivity 
growth in post-apartheid South Africa. IMF Working Paper WP/03/178. 
 
Atkinson, A. 1995A Incomes and the welfare state. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Atkinson, A. 1995B Public economics in action. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Atkinson, A. 1996 The case for participation income. Political Quarterly 67, 67-
70. 
 
Barr, N. 2001 The welfare state as piggy bank. Oxford: oxford University Press. 
 
Barry, B. 2000 UBI and the work ethic. Boston Review, October-November 
2000, 1-6.  
 
Bergmann, B. 2004 A Swedish-style welfare state or basic income: which 
should have priority? Politics & Society 32, 107-118. 
 
Besley, T. & R. Burgess 2003 Halving global poverty. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 17, 3-22. 
 
Blanchard, O. 2004 The economic future of Europe. NBER Working Paper 
10310, 1-36. 
   58
Blondal, S., S. Field & N. Girouard 2002 Investment in human capital through 
post-compulsory education and training: selected efficiency and equity aspects. 
OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 333, Paris: OECD. 
 
Bourguignon, F., F. Ferreira & M. Menendez 2003 Inequality of outcomes and 
inequality of opportunities in Brazil. World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper 3174, December 2003. 
 
Case, A. & A. Deaton 1998 Large cash transfers to the elderly in South Africa. 
Economic Journal 108, 1330-1361. 
 
Davis, S. & M. Henrekson 2004 Tax effects on work activity, industry mix and 
shadow economy size: evidence from rich-country comparisons. NBER Working 
Paper 10509, 1-44. 
 
Disney, R. 2004 Pensions and employment. Economic Policy, July 2004, 267-
311. 
 
Dornbusch, R. & S. Edwards 1991 The macroeconomics of populism in Latin 
America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Dowding, K., J. De Wispelaere & S. White 2003 Stakeholding – a new 
paradigm in social policy. Ch. 1 in The ethics of stakeholding (K. Dowding et al 
eds.) London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-28. 
 
Duflo, E. 2003 Grandmothers and granddaughters: old age pension and intra-
household allocation in South Africa. World Bank Economic Review 17, 1-25. 
 
Dworkin, R. 1978 Taking rights seriously. London: Duckworth. 
 
Freeman, R. 2001 The rising tide lifts…? NBER Working Paper 8155, 1-37. 
 
Goodin, R. 2000 Something for nothing? Boston Review, October-November 
2000, 1-6. 
 
Goodin, R. 2003 Sneaking up on stakeholding. In The ethics of stakeholding. (K. 
Dowding et al eds.) London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp65-78. 
 
Goodin, R., B. Headey, R. Muffels & H-J. Dirken 1999 Introduction in The real 
worlds of welfare capitalism (R. Goodin et al eds.) Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 1-36. 
   59
Goodin, R. & M. Rein 2003 Regimes on pillars: alternative welfare state logics 
and dynamics. Public Administration 79, 769-801. 
 
Gutmann, A. 1998 Introduction. In Work and welfare. (R. Solow) Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, pp. vii-xv. 
 
Haveman, R. & A. Beshadker 2001 The “inability to be self-reliant” as an 
indicator of poverty: trends for the US, 1975-97. Review of Income and Wealth 
47, 335-360. 
 
Hemming, R. & T. Ter-Minassian 2004 Making room for public investment. 
Finance and Development, December 2004, 30-33. 
 
Holtham, G. & J. Kay 1994 The assessment: institutions of policy. Oxford 
Review of  
Economic Policy 10, 1-16. 
 
IMF 2003 South Africa: selected issues. IMF Country Report No. 03/18. 
 
Immervoll, H. 2004 Average and marginal effective tax rates facing workers in 
the EU. A micro-level analysis of levels, distributions and driving factors. 
OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper No. 19, 1-42. 
 
Jensen, R. 2004 Do private transfers ‘displace’ the benefits of public transfers? 
Evidence from South Africa. Journal of Public Economics 88, 89-112. 
 
Lindert, P. 2003 Why the welfare state looks like a free lunch. NBER Working 
Paper 9869. 
 
Lund, F. 1993 State social benefits in South Africa. International Social Security 
Review 46, 5-25. 
 
Mohr, P. 1994 Can South Africa avoid macroeconomic populism? Development 
Southern Africa 11, 1-32. 
 
Moll, P., N. Nattrass & L. Loots 1991 Redistribution: how can it work in South 
Africa? Cape Town: David Philip. 
 
OECD 1999 Making work pay. OECD Economic Outlook 66, 151-159. 
 
OECD 2000 Tax burdens: alternative measures. OECD Tax Policy Studies No. 
2.   60
 
Pateman, C. 2003 Freedom and democratisation: why basic income is to be 
preferred to basic capital. In The ethics of stakeholding (K. Dowding et al eds.) 
London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 130-148. 
 
Pateman, C. 2004 Democratic citizenship: some advantages of a basic income. 
Mimeographed, Department of Political Science, UCLA. 
 
Phelps, E. 2000 The importance of inclusion and the power of job subsidies to 
increase it. OECD Economic Studies No. 31, 2000/1. 
 
Pritchett, L. & D. Filmer 1999 What education production functions really 
show: a positive theory of education expenditures. Economics of Education 
Review 18, 223-239. 
 
Rawls, J. 1971 A theory of justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
 
Rawls, J. 1999 A theory of justice: revised edition. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Rodrik, D. 2003 Introduction. Ch. 1 in In search of prosperity: analytical 
narratives on economic growth. (D. Rodrik ed.) Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, pp. 1-19.  
 
Ryan, P. 2001 The school-to-work transition: a cross-national perspective. 
Journal of Economic Literature 39, 34-92 
 
Samson, M. 2002 The social, economic and fiscal impact of comprehensive 
social security reform for South Africa. Social Dynamics 28, 69-97. 
 
Schlemmer, L. 1999 Corporate business in a wider role. CDE Focus Number 4, 
June 1999, 1-9 (Johannesburg). 
 
Seekings, J. 2002 The broader importance of welfare reform in South Africa. 
Social Dynamics 28, 1-38. 
 
Sen, A. 1992 Inequality re-examined. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Sen, A. 1995 Equality of what? In Equal freedom (S. Darwall ed.) Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, pp. 307-330. 
   61
Solow, R. 1997 Is there a core of usable macroeconomics we should all believe 
in? American Economic Review 87, 230-239. 
 
Solow, R 1998 Work and welfare. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Solow, R. 2003 Mysteries of growth. New York Review of Books, 3 July 2003. 
 
Stern, N. 2003 Foreword. In The impact of economic policies on poverty and 
income distribution. (F. Bourguignon & L. Pereira da Silva eds.) Washington: 
World Bank.    
 
UNDP [United Nations Development Programme] 2003 Human development 
report 2003: the challenge of sustainable development in South Africa. 
Published for UNDP South Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. 
 
Van den Noord, P. & C. Heady 2001 Surveillance of tax policies: a synthesis of 
findings in economic surveys. Economics Department Working Paper No. 303. 
 
Van de Walle, D. 1995 Introduction. In Public spending and the poor (D. van de 
Walle & K. Nead eds.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 1-10. 
 
Van Parijs, P. 1995 Real freedom for all. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Van Parijs, P. 2000 A basic income for all. Boston Review, October-November 
2000, 1-15. 
 
Van Parijs, P. 2004 Basic income: a simple and powerful idea for the twenty-
first century. Politics & Society 32, 7-39. 
 
Weisbrod, B. 1998 Modelling the nonprofit organization as a multiproduct firm: 
a framework for choice. In To profit or not to profit: the commercial 
transformation of the nonprofit sector (B. Weisbrod ed.). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 47-64. 
 
White, S. 2000 Review article: social rights and the social contract – political 
theory and the new welfare politics. British Journal of Political Science 30, 507-
532. 
 
White, S. 2003 Freedom, reciprocity, and the citizen’s stake. In The ethics of 
stakeholding (K. Dowding et al eds.). London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 79-93. 
   62
Woolard, I. 2004 Are the unemployed a homogeneous group? Evidence from 
panel data in Kwazulu-Natal. Labour Market Frontiers No. 6, December 2004, 
SA Reserve Bank. 
 
World Bank 2004 World development indicators 04. Washington: World Bank. 
 
Wright, E. 2004 Introduction. Politics & Society 32, 3-6. 
 
Young, D. 1998 Commercialism in nonprofit social service associations: its 
character, significance and rationale. In To profit or not to profit: the 
commercial transformation of the nonprofit sector (B. Weisbrod ed.). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 195-216. 